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Ideas for 'Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic', 'The Reasons of Love' and 'Human, All Too Human'

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22 ideas

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
Ranking order of desires reveals nothing, because none of them may be considered important [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
The history of morality rests on an error called 'responsibility', which rests on an error called 'free will' [Nietzsche]
Ceasing to believe in human responsibility is bitter, if you had based the nobility of humanity on it [Nietzsche]
It is absurd to blame nature and necessity; we should no more praise actions than we praise plants or artworks [Nietzsche]
Nietzsche said the will doesn't exist, so it can't ground moral responsibility [Nietzsche, by Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Intellect is tied to morality, because it requires good memory and powerful imagination [Nietzsche]
Morality isn't based on reason; moral indignation is quite unlike disapproval of irrationality [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / f. Übermensch
Originally it was the rulers who requited good for good and evil for evil who were called 'good' [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
If you don't care about at least one thing, you can't find reasons to care about anything [Frankfurt]
It is by caring about things that we infuse the world with importance [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
Our criteria for evaluating how to live offer an answer to the problem [Frankfurt]
What is worthwhile for its own sake alone may be worth very little [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
No one has ever done anything that was entirely for other people [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Simultaneous love and respect are impossible; love has no separation or rank, but respect admits power [Nietzsche]
Rather than loving things because we value them, I think we value things because we love them [Frankfurt]
The paradigm case of pure love is not romantic, but that between parents and infants [Frankfurt]
I value my children for their sake, but I also value my love for them for its own sake [Frankfurt]
Love can be cool, and it may not involve liking its object [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / h. Fine deeds
We get enormous pleasure from tales of noble actions [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
We can only achieve happy moments, not happy eras [Nietzsche]
We might not choose a very moral life, if the character or constitution was deficient [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
People want to fulfill their desires, but also for their desires to be sustained [Frankfurt]