Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Natural Goodness', 'Appearance and Reality' and 'Against Liberalism'
expand these ideas
|
start again
|
choose
another area for these texts
display all the ideas for this combination of texts
20 ideas
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
|
23093
|
Moral and causal responsibility are not clearly distinct [Kekes]
|
|
23096
|
Morality should aim to prevent all evil actions, not just autonomous ones [Kekes]
|
|
23087
|
Much human evil is not autonomous, so moral responsibility need not be autonomous [Kekes]
|
|
23098
|
Effects show the existence of moral responsibility, and mental states show the degree [Kekes]
|
|
23089
|
Evil people may not be autonomously aware, if they misjudge the situation [Kekes]
|
|
23094
|
Ought implies can means moral responsibility needs autonomy [Kekes]
|
|
23095
|
Why should moral responsibility depend on autonomy, rather than social role or experience? [Kekes]
|
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
|
23686
|
Moral reason is not just neutral, because morality is part of the standard of rationality [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
|
|
23693
|
Practical rationality must weigh both what is morally and what is non-morally required [Foot]
|
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
|
23687
|
Moral virtues arise from human nature, as part of what makes us good human beings [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
|
|
23090
|
Liberals assume people are naturally free, equal, rational, and morally good [Kekes]
|
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
|
22493
|
Sterility is a human defect, but the choice to be childless is not [Foot]
|
|
22492
|
Virtues are as necessary to humans as stings are to bees [Foot]
|
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
|
22491
|
Moral evaluations are not separate from facts, but concern particular facts about functioning [Foot]
|
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
|
23117
|
Love should be partial, and discriminate in favour of its object [Kekes]
|
|
23119
|
Sentimental love distorts its object [Kekes]
|
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
|
23088
|
Evil is not deviation from the good, any more than good is a deviation from evil [Kekes]
|
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
|
23097
|
What matters for morality is the effects of action, not the psychological causes [Kekes]
|
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
|
22497
|
Deep happiness usually comes from the basic things in life [Foot]
|
|
22498
|
Happiness is enjoying the pursuit and attainment of right ends [Foot]
|