Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Natural Goodness', 'Value Theory' and 'A priori/A posteriori'
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20 ideas
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
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23686
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Moral reason is not just neutral, because morality is part of the standard of rationality [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
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23693
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Practical rationality must weigh both what is morally and what is non-morally required [Foot]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
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23687
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Moral virtues arise from human nature, as part of what makes us good human beings [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
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22492
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Virtues are as necessary to humans as stings are to bees [Foot]
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22493
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Sterility is a human defect, but the choice to be childless is not [Foot]
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
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18685
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Final value is favoured for its own sake, and personal value for someone's sake [Orsi]
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18666
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Value-maker concepts (such as courageous or elegant) simultaneously describe and evaluate [Orsi]
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18667
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The '-able' concepts (like enviable) say this thing deserves a particular response [Orsi]
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18679
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Things are only valuable if something makes it valuable, and we can ask for the reason [Orsi]
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18682
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A complex value is not just the sum of the values of the parts [Orsi]
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18683
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Trichotomy Thesis: comparable values must be better, worse or the same [Orsi]
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18686
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The Fitting Attitude view says values are fitting or reasonable, and values are just byproducts [Orsi]
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
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22491
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Moral evaluations are not separate from facts, but concern particular facts about functioning [Foot]
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
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18672
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Values from reasons has the 'wrong kind of reason' problem - admiration arising from fear [Orsi]
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
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18677
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A thing may have final value, which is still derived from other values, or from relations [Orsi]
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
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18668
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Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes [Orsi]
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18670
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The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi]
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18669
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Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring [Orsi]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
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22497
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Deep happiness usually comes from the basic things in life [Foot]
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22498
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Happiness is enjoying the pursuit and attainment of right ends [Foot]
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