Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake?', 'Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good' and 'fragments/reports'
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11 ideas
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism
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22485
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Non-cognitivists give the conditions of use of moral sentences as facts about the speaker [Foot]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
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6238
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We approve of actions by a superior moral sense [Hutcheson]
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6239
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We dislike a traitor, even if they give us great benefit [Hutcheson]
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6240
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The moral sense is not an innate idea, but an ability to approve or disapprove in a disinterested way [Hutcheson]
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6242
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We cannot choose our moral feelings, otherwise bribery could affect them [Hutcheson]
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6247
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Everyone feels uneasy when seeing others in pain, unless the others are evil [Hutcheson]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
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22486
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The mistake is to think good grounds aren't enough for moral judgement, which also needs feelings [Foot]
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
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22487
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Moral arguments are grounded in human facts [Foot]
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
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6244
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Human nature seems incapable of universal malice, except what results from self-love [Hutcheson]
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
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6243
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As death approaches, why do we still care about family, friends or country? [Hutcheson]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
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6246
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My action is not made good by a good effect, if I did not foresee and intend it [Hutcheson]
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