Combining Texts
Ideas for
'works', 'In Defense of Absolute Essentialism' and 'Value Theory'
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17 ideas
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
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7503
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Plato never refers to examining the conscience [Plato, by Foucault]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
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2173
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As religion and convention collapsed, Plato sought morals not just in knowledge, but in the soul [Williams,B on Plato]
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
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18666
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Value-maker concepts (such as courageous or elegant) simultaneously describe and evaluate [Orsi]
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18667
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The '-able' concepts (like enviable) say this thing deserves a particular response [Orsi]
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18685
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Final value is favoured for its own sake, and personal value for someone's sake [Orsi]
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18679
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Things are only valuable if something makes it valuable, and we can ask for the reason [Orsi]
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18682
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A complex value is not just the sum of the values of the parts [Orsi]
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18683
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Trichotomy Thesis: comparable values must be better, worse or the same [Orsi]
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18686
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The Fitting Attitude view says values are fitting or reasonable, and values are just byproducts [Orsi]
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
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18672
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Values from reasons has the 'wrong kind of reason' problem - admiration arising from fear [Orsi]
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
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18677
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A thing may have final value, which is still derived from other values, or from relations [Orsi]
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
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18668
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Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes [Orsi]
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18670
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The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi]
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18669
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Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring [Orsi]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
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9274
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Plato's legacy to European thought was the Good, the Beautiful and the True [Plato, by Gray]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
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94
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Pleasure is better with the addition of intelligence, so pleasure is not the good [Plato, by Aristotle]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
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17947
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Plato decided that the virtuous and happy life was the philosophical life [Plato, by Nehamas]
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