Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Universal Prescriptivism', 'Action, Reasons and Causes' and 'The Right and the Good'

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31 ideas

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / e. Ethical cognitivism
5911 Moral duties are as fundamental to the universe as the axioms of mathematics [Ross]
5926 The beauty of a patch of colour might be the most important fact about it [Ross]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
7259 Ross said moral principles are self-evident from the facts, but not from pure thought [Ross, by Dancy,J]
5913 The moral convictions of thoughtful educated people are the raw data of ethics [Ross]
2705 How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare]
2712 You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
2706 Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
2709 Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare]
2704 If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare]
2703 Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare]
2707 If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare]
2708 An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare]
2711 Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
5920 Value is held to be either a quality, or a relation (usually between a thing and a mind) [Ross]
5923 The arguments for value being an objective or a relation fail, so it appears to be a quality [Ross]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
5918 The thing is intrinsically good if it would be good when nothing else existed [Ross]
5930 All things being equal, we all prefer the virtuous to be happy, not the vicious [Ross]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / e. Means and ends
5922 An instrumentally good thing might stay the same, but change its value because of circumstances [Ross]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
5921 We can ask of pleasure or beauty whether they are valuable, but not of goodness [Ross]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
5932 The four goods are: virtue, pleasure, just allocation of pleasure, and knowledge [Ross]
5910 The three intrinsic goods are virtue, knowledge and pleasure [Ross]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / c. Right and good
5898 'Right' and 'good' differ in meaning, as in a 'right action' and a 'good man' [Ross]
5899 If there are two equally good acts, they may both be right, but neither a duty [Ross]
5904 In the past 'right' just meant what is conventionally accepted [Ross]
5919 Goodness is a wider concept than just correct ethical conduct [Ross]
5941 Motives decide whether an action is good, and what is done decides whether it was right [Ross]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / d. Good as virtue
5938 Virtue is superior to pleasure, as pleasure is never a duty, but goodness is [Ross]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / e. Good as knowledge
5931 All other things being equal, a universe with more understanding is better [Ross]
5939 Morality is not entirely social; a good moral character should love truth [Ross]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
5905 We clearly value good character or understanding, as well as pleasure [Ross]
5929 No one thinks it doesn't matter whether pleasure is virtuously or viciously acquired [Ross]