Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Universal Prescriptivism', 'Principles of Arithmetic, by a new method' and 'The View from Nowhere'
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13 ideas
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
2705
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How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare]
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2712
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You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
2706
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Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
2704
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If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare]
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2703
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Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare]
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2707
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If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare]
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2708
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An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare]
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2711
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Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare]
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2709
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Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare]
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
3257
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Total objectivity can't see value, but it sees many people with values [Nagel]
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
3265
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We don't worry about the time before we were born the way we worry about death [Nagel]
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
3263
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If our own life lacks meaning, devotion to others won't give it meaning [Nagel]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
3256
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Pain doesn't have a further property of badness; it gives a reason for its avoidance [Nagel]
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