Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Universal Prescriptivism', 'works' and 'Principle Doctrines ('Kuriai Doxai') (frags)'
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12 ideas
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
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2705
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How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare]
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2712
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You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
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22086
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The most important aspect of a human being is not reason, but passion [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
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2706
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Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
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2709
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Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare]
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2704
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If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare]
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2703
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Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare]
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2707
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If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare]
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2708
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An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare]
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2711
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Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / c. Value of happiness
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14522
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What happens to me if I obtain all my desires, and what if I fail? [Epicurus]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / e. Role of pleasure
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3563
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Pleasure and virtue entail one another [Epicurus]
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