display all the ideas for this combination of texts
4 ideas
| 5077 | The modern idea of obligation seems to have lost the idea of an obligation 'to' something [Taylor,R] |
| Full Idea: In modern moral thinking, obligation is something every responsible person is supposed to have, but it is not an obligation to the state, or society, or humanity, or even to God. It is an obligation standing by itself. | |
| From: Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.12) | |
| A reaction: This nicely pinpoints how some our moral attitudes are relics of religion. Taylor wants a return to virtue, but one could respond by opting for the social contract (with very clear obligations) or Kantian 'contractualism' (answering to rational beings). |
| 19230 | People should follow what lies before them, and is within their power [Peirce] |
| Full Idea: Each person ought to select some definite duty that clearly lies before him and is well within his power as the special task of his life. | |
| From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], I) | |
| A reaction: I like that. Note especially that it should be 'well' within his power. Note also that this is a 'duty', and not just a friendly suggestion. Not sure what the basis of the duty is. |
| 5066 | If we are made in God's image, pursuit of excellence is replaced by duty to obey God [Taylor,R] |
| Full Idea: Once people are declared to be images of God, just by virtue of minimal humanity, they have, therefore, no greater individual excellence to aspire to, and their purpose became one of obligation, that is, obedience to God's will. | |
| From: Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: An interesting and plausible historical analysis. There is a second motivation for the change, though, in Grotius's desire to develop a more legalistic morality, focusing on actions rather than character. Taylor's point is more interesting, though. |
| 5065 | The ethics of duty requires a religious framework [Taylor,R] |
| Full Idea: The ethics of duty cannot be sustained independently of a religious framework. | |
| From: Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: This is a big challenge to Kant, echoing Nietzsche's jibe that Kant just wanted to be 'obedient'. The only options are either 'natural duties', or 'duties of reason'. Reason may have a pull (like pleasure), but a 'duty'? Difficult. |