display all the ideas for this combination of texts
17 ideas
| 5967 | People need nothing except corn and water [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
| Full Idea: Chrysippus praises ad nauseam the lines "For what need mortals save two things alone,/ Demeter's grain and draughts of water clear". | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1043e | |
| A reaction: "Oh, reason not the need!" says King Lear. The remark shows the close affinity of stoicism and cynicism, as the famous story of Diogenes is that he threw away his drinking cup when he realised you could drink with your hands. |
| 4252 | Promise keeping increases reliability, by making deliberation focus on something which would be overlooked [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: The institution of promise keeping operates to provide portable reliability, by offering a formula that will confer high deliberative priority on what might not otherwise receive it. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch.10) | |
| A reaction: This is a bit pessimistic. We do not perceive promise keeping as a mere suggestion that we should bear something in mind when making a decision. 'May I rot in hell if I fail you'. |
| 4116 | A weakness of contractual theories is the position of a person of superior ability and power [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: A particular weakness of the contractual theory is that it is unstable with respect to a superior agent, one more intelligent and resourceful and persuasive than the rest. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 3) | |
| A reaction: The very weak are equally a problem. Democratic societies produce fewer inequalities. Hierarchical societies are miserable (I expect..). |
| 5966 | All virtue is good, but not always praised (as in not lusting after someone ugly) [Chrysippus] |
| Full Idea: Although deeds done in accordance with virtue are congenial, not all are cited as examples, such as courageously extending one's finger, or continently abstaining from a half-dead old woman, or not immediately agreeing that three is four. | |
| From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE], fr 211), quoted by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1038f | |
| A reaction: Presumably the point (so elegantly expressed - what a shame we have lost most of Chrysippus) is that virtue comes in degrees, even though its value is an absolute. The same has been said (by Russell and Bonjour) about self-evidence. |
| 20855 | Chrysippus says virtue can be lost (though Cleanthes says it is too secure for that) [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Chrysippus says that virtue can be lost, owing to drunkenness and excess of black bile, whereas Cleanthes says it cannot, because it consists in secure intellectual grasps, and it is worth choosing for its own sake. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.127 | |
| A reaction: Succumbing to drunkenness looks like evidence that you were not truly virtuous. Mental illness is something else. On the whole I agree the Cleanthes. |
| 5970 | Chrysippus says nothing is blameworthy, as everything conforms with the best nature [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
| Full Idea: Chrysippus has often written on the theme that there is nothing reprehensible or blameworthy in the universe since all things are accomplished in conformity with the best nature. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1051b | |
| A reaction: This is Leibniz's "best of all possible worlds", but deriving the idea from the rightness of nature rather than the perfection of God. Chrysippus has a more plausible ground than Leibniz, as for him nasty things follow from conscious choice. |
| 4112 | A crucial feature of moral thought is second-order desire - the desire to have certain desires [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: Recently there has been much emphasis on the importance of our capacity to have second-order desires - the desire to have certain desires - and its significance for ethical reflection and the practical consciousness. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 1) | |
| A reaction: This is a crucial point if we are to defend a reasonably rational view of morality against (say) emotivism. I agree that it is crucial to morality. |
| 4113 | 'Deon' in Greek means what one must do; there was no word meaning 'duty' [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: There is no ancient Greek word for duty; the word 'deon' (the basis of 'deontology') means what one must do. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 1) | |
| A reaction: Presumably it covered compulsions which were not duties, such as the need to eat or drink. Greeks thought morally, but lacked a good moral vocabulary? |
| 4250 | The concept of a 'duty to myself' is fraudulent [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: The concept of a 'duty to myself' is fraudulent. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch.10) | |
| A reaction: The only person who can offer a rebuttal of this is Aristotle. With the magnet of the Platonic Form of the Good, I can perceive the natural excellences of which I am capable, and feel a duty to pursue them. |
| 4110 | Obligation and duty look backwards (because of a promise or job), although the acts are in the future [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: Obligation and duty look backwards; the acts they require lie in the future, but the reasons for those acts lie in the fact that I have already promised, the job I have undertaken, the position I am already in. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 1) | |
| A reaction: Maybe the central issue in morality is forwards versus backwards. It reflects two types of human temperament. Tomorrow is another day. Spilt milk. |
| 4249 | "Ought implies can" is a famous formula in connection with moral obligation [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: "Ought implies can" is a famous formula in connection with moral obligation. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch.10) | |
| A reaction: Williams says it is true in particular instances, but is not generally true of 'ought'. Maybe you 'ought' before you know whether you 'can'. |
| 4248 | Not all moral deliberations lead to obligations; some merely reveal what 'may' be done [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: Not every conclusion of moral deliberation expresses an obligation; for example, some moral conclusions merely announce that you 'may' do something. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch.10) | |
| A reaction: An important point for any deontological ethics. It may be possible to translate what 'may' be done into some form of duty, but it will probably involve contortions. |
| 4121 | Why should I think of myself as both the legislator and the citizen who follows the laws? [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: Why should I think of myself as a legislator and at the same time a citizen of a republic governed by some notional laws? | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 4) | |
| A reaction: Kant's answer is supposed to be 'because you are rational, and hence must want consistency'. If we were all rational, Kant would be right. |
| 4122 | If the self becomes completely impartial, it no longer has enough identity to worry about its interests [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: How can an 'I' that has taken on the perspective of impartiality be left with enough identity to live a life that respects its own interests? | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 4) | |
| A reaction: Not a big problem. Thought constantly flips between objective and subjective, as Nagel has shown us. Compare Nagel in Idea 6446. |
| 4124 | Utilitarian benevolence involves no particular attachments, and is immune to the inverse square law [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: Utilitarian benevolence involves no particular attachments, and it is immune to the inverse square law. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 5) | |
| A reaction: Nicely put. The point is that the theory is inhuman, but Mill says it tells us what we should do, not what we actually tend to do. |
| 4245 | Ethical conviction must be to some extent passive, and can't just depend on the will and decisions [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: The view that the only alternative to the intellect is the will, and the source of ethical conviction is decisions about principles and ways of life, cannot be right; ethical conviction, like any conviction, must to some extent come to you passively. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 9) | |
| A reaction: Seems right. We cannot choose our factual beliefs (look at the sun and believe it is cloudy!). Could I 'decide' that it was right to betray my family just for fun? |
| 4246 | Taking responsibility won't cure ethical uncertainty by; we are uncertain what to decide [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: If ethics is a matter of decision, and we must face the responsibility and burden of those decisions, this ignores the obvious point that if we are uncertain, then we are uncertain what to decide. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 9) | |
| A reaction: Good point. The defence would be that the decision itself contains the seeds of certainty. Do something rather than nothing, and the sense of it will emerge. Modify as you go along. |