Combining Texts

Ideas for 'The Discourses', 'Introduction to Virtue Ethics' and 'Truth (2nd edn)'

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11 ideas

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism
All human ills result from failure to apply preconceptions to particular cases [Epictetus]
     Full Idea: The cause of all human ills is that people are incapable of applying their general preconceptions to particular cases.
     From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 4.01.42)
     A reaction: I'm not sure whether 'preconceptions' is meant pejoratively (as unthinking, and opposed to true principles). This sounds like modern particularism (e.g. Jonathan Dancy) to the letter.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
Virtue theory isn't a genuine ethical theory, because it doesn't have universal application [Statman]
     Full Idea: It can be claimed that universality is a necessary property of any ethical theory and therefore virtue theory, which fails in this respect, is not a theory, and hence poses no alternative to genuine ethical theories.
     From: Daniel Statman (Introduction to Virtue Ethics [1997], §5)
     A reaction: Replies: a) totally universal morality is an idle dream (part of the 'Enlightenment Project' to prove everything) and we must settle for something more relative; b) virtues aren't totally universal, but they are truths about humanity. I prefer b).
Promises create moral duties that have nothing to do with character [Statman]
     Full Idea: That duties are created irrespective of facts about character is obvious from the case of promises, which bind their makers irrespective of their motives or personality.
     From: Daniel Statman (Introduction to Virtue Ethics [1997], §5)
     A reaction: Just occasionally a promise can be broken, by a sensitive and wise person. I promise to give your son some money; I then discover he is a drug dealer. Promises arise out of character, and cannot be made by robots.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / a. Natural virtue
We have a natural sense of honour [Epictetus]
     Full Idea: What faculty do you mean? - Have we not a natural sense of honour? - We have.
     From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 2.10.22)
     A reaction: This seems unlikely, given the lower status that honour now has with us, compared to two hundred years ago. But there may be a natural sense of status, and of humiliation and shame.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
If someone harms themselves in harming me, then I harm myself by returning the harm [Epictetus]
     Full Idea: Since he has harmed himself by wronging me, shall not I harm myself by harming him?
     From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 2.10.26)
     A reaction: I am very keen on this idea. See Hamlet's remarks to Polonius about 'honour and dignity'. The best strategy for achieving moral excellence is to focus on our own characters, rather than how to act, and to respond to others.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
Moral education is better by concrete example than abstract principle [Statman]
     Full Idea: According to virtue theory, education through moral exemplars is more effective than education focused on principles and obligations, because it is far more concrete.
     From: Daniel Statman (Introduction to Virtue Ethics [1997], §3)
     A reaction: Aristotle's view is that virtues must be developed from childhood, when principles don't mean much. The problem is that young people may witness highly virtuous behaviour in their exemplars, but totally fail to appreciate it without mention of principles.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
In the Discourses choice [prohairesis] defines our character and behaviour [Epictetus, by Frede,M]
     Full Idea: In Epictetus's 'Discourses' the notion of choice [prohairesis] plays perhaps the central role. It is our prohairesis which defines us a person, as the sort of person we are; it is our prohairesis which determines how we behave.
     From: report of Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56]) by Michael Frede - A Free Will 3
     A reaction: Frede is charting the gradual move in Greek philosophy from action by desire, reason and habit to action by the will (which then turns out to be 'free'). Character started as dispositions and ended as choices.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / b. Health
Health is only a good when it is used well [Epictetus]
     Full Idea: Is health a good and sickness an evil? No. Health is good when used well, and bad when used ill.
     From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 3.20.04)
     A reaction: Although I like the idea that health is a natural value, which bridges the gap from facts to values (as a successful function), there is no denying that the health of very evil people is not something the rest of us hope for.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
Friends express friendship even when no utility is involved [Statman]
     Full Idea: Being a good friend means acting in ways that express the friendship even when those ways do not promote overall utility.
     From: Daniel Statman (Introduction to Virtue Ethics [1997], §3)
     A reaction: This implies that friendship is a true virtue of character, rather than having friends just being an 'external' good. Having friends is good; being friends is a virtue. There are duties of friendship.
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
Behaviour may be disgusting or inhumane, but violate no duty [Statman]
     Full Idea: It is surely possible, and indeed often the case, that people who violate no duty nevertheless behave in an inhumane and a disgusting manner.
     From: Daniel Statman (Introduction to Virtue Ethics [1997], §1)
     A reaction: This seems right, though it is easier to be disgusting than to be inhumane if no duty is to be violated. Social duties may not require a high degree of humanity, pure Kantian duties might.
The ancients recognised imperfect duties, but we have added perfect duties like justice [Statman]
     Full Idea: The advantage of modern thinkers over the ancient virtue ethicists is that in addition to imperfect duties (i.e. virtues) they also recognise the existence of perfect duties, or duties of justice, which are essential for the existence of society.
     From: Daniel Statman (Introduction to Virtue Ethics [1997], §7)
     A reaction: Even the Greeks had laws (e.g. Idea 422), so they understood that a society needs rules, but many laws don't seem to be moral rules (e.g. car parking), and the Greeks thought morality was about human excellence, not avoiding traffic jams.