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Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Animal Rights and Wrongs' and 'Writings from Late Notebooks'

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7 ideas

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
Virtue is wasteful, as it reduces us all to being one another's nurse [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Nothing would be more expensive than virtue: for in the end it would give us the earth as an infirmary, and 'Everyone to be everyone else's nurse' would be the pinnacle of wisdom.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Writings from Late Notebooks [1887], 04[7])
     A reaction: Once again, I think that Nietzsche does not understand Aristotelian virtue theory. This attacks Christian virtue (his bête noir), with its emphasis on compassion and humility. A truly virtuous person is more likely to be an artist/politician/philosopher.
Virtue for everyone removes its charm of being exceptional and aristocratic [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: The preachers of virtue are its worst enemies. For they teach virtue as an ideal for everyone; they take from virtue the charm of the rare, the inimitable, the exceptional and unaverage - its aristocratic magic.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Writings from Late Notebooks [1887], 10[109])
     A reaction: At last I think I have found why Nietzsche disliked Aristotle, who makes elementary 'phronesis' (practical reason) a sufficient intellectual endowment to achieve virtue, with no need of more than moderate wealth or power. I prefer Aristotle.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
What does not kill us makes us stronger [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: What does not kill us makes us stronger.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Writings from Late Notebooks [1887], 10[87])
     A reaction: A famous remark! Actually, of course, a very stressful human life tends to be much shorter than a comfortable one, but Nietzsche wouldn't equate strength with longevity. Nowadays we are all a bunch of softies.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
Courage, compassion, insight, solitude are the virtues, with courtesy a necessary vice [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Our four cardinal virtues: courage, compassion, insight and solitude - they would be unbearable to themselves if they hadn't forged an alliance with a cheerful and mischievous vice called 'courtesy'.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Writings from Late Notebooks [1887], 02[13])
     A reaction: Nietzsche was wonderfully wicked. I struggle (with Aristotle) to see how a naturally social creature can have solitude as a virtue. It is startling to see Nietzsche naming compassion as a virtue, but how ironic is the whole remark?
The modern virtues are courage, prudence, wisdom, temperance, justice, charity and loyalty [Scruton]
     Full Idea: The antique virtues of courage, prudence, wisdom, temperance and justice, amplified by Christian charity and pagan loyalty, still form the core idea of human excellence.
     From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.33)
     A reaction: I always think sense of humour has become a key modern virtue. Where did that come from? Maybe a sense of irony is a good thing. How about efficiency (which is Plato's idea of justice!)?
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
Only just people will drop their own self-interests when faced with an impartial verdict [Scruton]
     Full Idea: Only just people will act on the impartial verdict when their own interests conflict with it.
     From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.61)
     A reaction: The Kantian account of the virtues. Virtues are seen in the acceptance of a range of obvious human duties. Very helpful point if one is aiming for one unified theory of morality.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
Sympathy can undermine the moral order just as much as crime does [Scruton]
     Full Idea: A person who lives by sympathy may undermine the moral order as effectively as the one who lives by crime.
     From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.54)
     A reaction: A slightly chilling remark. Presumably one should not feel too much for suffering which is deserved. What about unavoidable suffering? It is certainly important to see that some suffering is morally good (e.g. grief or remorse).