display all the ideas for this combination of texts
15 ideas
| 5876 | Virtue is different from continence [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Virtue is different from continence. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1227b17) | |
| A reaction: Basic to Aristotle - in that continence leads to right action, but that is not enough for virtue, which requires inner harmony, reason, and pleasure in doing what is right. Hence Aristotle is quite distinct from deontological or consequentialist views. |
| 5872 | Excellence is the best state of anything (like a cloak) which has an employment or function [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Excellence is the best disposition, state or capacity of anything that has some employment or function; this is evident from induction. For example, a cloak has an excellence - and a certain function and employment also; its best state is its excellence. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1219a02) | |
| A reaction: 'Employment' will be an assigned function, and 'function' will be a natural or intrinsic function, I presume. This is a nice clear illustration of the fact that for Aristotle virtue runs continuously from people to cloaks. See Idea 1663, though. |
| 5875 | Character (éthos) is developed from habit (ethos) [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Character (éthos), as the word itself indicates, is developed from habit (ethos). | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1220a36) | |
| A reaction: Aristotle goes in for dubious etymologies, but this one sounds quite significant, and supports his view that habit is central to virtue. We would lose nothing in English if we said 'what are her habits?' instead of 'what is her character?'. |
| 5874 | Character virtues (such as courage) are of the non-rational part, which follows the rational part [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The virtues of character belong to the part that is non-rational, but whose nature is to follow the rational part; we do not say what a man's character is like when we say that he is wise or clever, but when we say that he is gentle or daring. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1220a11) | |
| A reaction: In the Nichomachean Ethics it appears that good character is the 'harmony' between the two parts; here it sounds more like obedience. It seems to me that our rational part is a failure if it is not sensitive to the needs of the irrational part. |
| 22516 | Character is shown by what is or is not enjoyed, and virtue chooses the mean among them [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Virtue is that state of character which chooses the mean, relative to us, in things pleasant and unpleasant, all those in respect of which a man is said to have a certain sort of character according as he enjoys or suffers pain from them. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1227b08) | |
| A reaction: The 'mean' should be understood as what is appropriate, rather than the mere average. Strong anger, for example, is sometimes appropriate. Does Aristotle rule out wild laughter, or frenetic dancing? Is a state of ecstasy wicked? |
| 22517 | We judge character not by their actions, but by their reasons for actions [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is from his choosing that we judge what sort of person someone is; that is, what that for whose sake he does something is, not what he does. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1228a03) | |
| A reaction: Not entirely true. It can be sufficient to reveal their character that a person does some particular thing, as novelists know. When Hud parks his car in her flowerbed, we don't need to enquire about his reason. But see 1228a16! |
| 23914 | People sometimes exhibit both extremes together, but the mean is contrary to both of them [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The mean is more contrary to the extremes than the extremes are to each other, because it does not occur with either of them, whereas the extremes often occur with each other. People can be rash cowards, or wasteful in some things and generous in others. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1234a33) | |
| A reaction: This rather undermines the neat visual metaphor of a sliding scale, but gives a more accurate account of the mean. The diagram needs three dimensions, instead of two. |
| 23911 | Possessors of a virtue tend to despise what reason shows to be its opposite [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Each virtue makes its possessor tend to despise great things that are contrary to reason - for example, courage does this of dangers, …a temperate person of many pleasures, and a generous one of many sorts of wealth. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1232a37) | |
| A reaction: I like the observation that the generous tend to despise wealth, implying that those who love wealth tend to lack generosity. Christianity has encouraged us to reject the idea of despising anything - but that seems to iron out common sense values. |
| 23910 | Greatness of soul produces all the virtues - and vice versa [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: All the virtues will follow along with greatness of soul, or it will follow along with all of them | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1232a36) | |
| A reaction: This is obviously similar in some respects to Nietzsche's 'higher' man, though that suggests greater independence, rather than being an ideal citizen. |
| 23908 | If someone just looks at or listens to beautiful things, they would not be thought intemperate [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If someone looks at a beautiful statue, or horse, or human being, or listens to someone singing …just to look at or listen to beautiful things, he would not be thought to be intemperate, any more than those beguiled by the Sirens would. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1230b31) | |
| A reaction: He says that intemperance mainly concerns taste and touch, rather than mere looking or listening. I think obsessive collectors of beautiful objects might drift into intemperance. |
| 23905 | Courage follows reason, which tells us to choose what is noble [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Courage is a following of reason, and reason orders us to choose what is noble. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1229a01) | |
| A reaction: This sounds right to me. Courage, in all sorts of contexts, seems to arise in people who sustain their focus on what is the right thing to do. |
| 23912 | Honour depends on what it is for, and whether it is bestowed by worthy people [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It makes a difference whether the honour comes from many random people or from those worthy of note, and again so does by whom and for what the honor is conferred. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1232b18) | |
| A reaction: He tends to play down honour because of its relativism, but this quotation implies that if an honour was bestowed by the worthy, for something of agreed high value, then it would be at quite a different level from mere popular esteem. Celebrity v peerage? |
| 5871 | Goods in the soul are more worthy than those outside it, as everybody wants them [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: All goods are either in the soul or outside it, and it is those in the soul that are more worthy of choice; for wisdom, virtue and pleasure are in the soul, and some or all of these seem to be an end for everyone. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1218b34) | |
| A reaction: An interesting reason for this assertion - that it is true because everybody agrees on it. See Idea 95. I would think that he might claim that our soul is our essence, whereas external goods pander to the non-essential in us. |
| 23920 | Decent people can be friends with base people [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is possible for a decent person to be friends with a base one. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1238b01) | |
| A reaction: This is on the basis of being useful, or of having something in common. Presumably friendship can come in degrees, as well as being of different kinds. Even the finest people can differ a lot, and only have a limited friendship. |
| 23919 | Friendship cannot be immediate; it takes time, and needs testing [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Just as if people wish to be healthy they do not become healthy, so if they wish to be friends they are not immediately in fact friends. …[1237b40] For a friend is not to be had without a test or in a single day, but needs time. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1237b21) | |
| A reaction: The voice of experience, I think. Obviously trust is basic, and it would be unwise to trust a possible friend on the first day. Since politics aims at friendship, I presume the support of the rule of law helps to achieve trust. |