display all the ideas for this combination of texts
3 ideas
| 22725 | When players don't meet again, defection is the best strategy [Axelrod] |
| Full Idea: When players will never meet again, the strategy of defection is the only stable strategy. | |
| From: Robert Axelrod (The Evolution of Co-Operation [1984], 5) | |
| A reaction: This gives good grounds for any community's mistrust of transient strangers, such as tourists. And yet any sensible tourist will want communities to trust tourists, and will therefore behave in a reliable way. |
| 22724 | Good strategies avoid conflict, respond to hostility, forgive, and are clear [Axelrod] |
| Full Idea: Successful game strategies avoid unnecessary conflict, are provoked by an uncalled for defection, forgive after a provocation, and behave clearly so the other player can adapt. | |
| From: Robert Axelrod (The Evolution of Co-Operation [1984], 1) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] Exactly what you would expect from a nice but successful school teacher. The strategies for success in these games is the same as the rules for educating a person into cooperative behaviour. TIT FOR TAT does all these. |
| 5398 | Judgements of usefulness depend on judgements of value [Russell] |
| Full Idea: All judgements as to what is useful depend upon some judgement as to what has value on its own account. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 7) | |
| A reaction: This is a beautifully simple point to be made about utilitarianism. The notion that pleasure is the sole good is prior, and the first two sentences in Bentham totally beg that question. What is the value of pleasure? Is it wicked to turn down a pleasure? |