Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'What is the Basis of Moral Obligation?' and 'An Argument for the Identity Theory'

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3 ideas

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism
I see the need to pay a debt in a particular instance, and any instance will do [Prichard]
     Full Idea: How can I be brought to see the truth of the principle of paying a debt except in connection with a particular instance? For this purpose any instance will do. If I cannot see that I ought to pay this debt, I shall not see that I ought to a debt.
     From: H.A. Prichard (What is the Basis of Moral Obligation? [1925])
     A reaction: This isn't quite particularism, which would (I think) say that the degree of obligation will never be quite the same in any two situations, and so one instance will not suffice to understand the duty.
The complexities of life make it almost impossible to assess morality from a universal viewpoint [Prichard]
     Full Idea: Owing to the complication of human relations, the problem of what one ought to do from the point of view of life as a whole is one of intense difficulty.
     From: H.A. Prichard (What is the Basis of Moral Obligation? [1925])
     A reaction: I suspect that the difficulty is not the problems engendered by complexity, but that there is no answer available from the most objective point of view. Morality simply is a matter of how daily life is conducted, with medium-term goals only.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').