7903
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The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
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Full Idea:
The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
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From:
Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
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A reaction:
What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').
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18626
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One view says start with equality, and infer equal weight to interests, and hence maximum utility [Kymlicka]
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Full Idea:
The first main argument for utilitarianism is that people matter equally, and hence each person's interests should be given equal weight, and hence morally right acts will maximise utility.
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From:
Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 2.4.a)
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A reaction:
The point is that this starts from the aim of equality, and infers maximum utility as its consequence. Equality has a primitive value. Whenever you dig down to a primitive value in a theory, I just find myself puzzled. What can justify basic equality?
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18627
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A second view says start with maximising the good, implying aggregation, and hence equality [Kymlicka]
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Full Idea:
The second main argument for utilitarianism defines the right in terms of maximising the good, which leads to the utilitarian aggregation standard, which as a mere consequence treats people's interests equally.
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From:
Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 2.4.b)
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A reaction:
This takes maximum good as a primitive, and arrives at equality as the way to achieve it. So which is more morally fundamental, a maximum of goodness, or human equality? Kymlicka says this idea is too impersonal.
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