Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Cratylus' and 'Against Liberalism'

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4 ideas

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
'Arete' signifies lack of complexity and a free-flowing soul [Plato]
     Full Idea: 'Areté' signifies lack of perplexity [euporia, ease of movement], and that the flow of a good soul is unimpeded.
     From: Plato (Cratylus [c.377 BCE], 415d)
     A reaction: Some highly dubious etymology going on here, and throughout 'Cratylus', but it gives a nice feeling for the way Socrates and Plato saw virtue.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
It is said that if an agent is not autonomous then their evil actions don't reflect on their character [Kekes]
     Full Idea: Liberals deny the reflexivity of evil, …to prevent the evil consequences of an agent's morally deplorable actions from redounding to their detriment. Evil actions are allowed to reflect on their agents only if the agents cause them autonomously.
     From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 03.5)
     A reaction: A central question of morality is essentialising character. That is, when does an eater of carrots become a carrot-eater? When does a performer of wicked deeds become a wicked person? Never, say many liberals. Wrong, says Kekes.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
Awareness of others' suffering doesn't create an obligation to help [Kekes]
     Full Idea: It is a mistaken assumption that knowledge of the sufferings of others creates an obligation to help them.
     From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 09.4)
     A reaction: A nice question is when that knowledge does become an obligation. The obvious criteria are proximity to the suffering, and capacity to relieve it. But then a wealthy person couldn't walk down the street without such obigations. Hm.