display all the ideas for this combination of texts
10 ideas
7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |
3261 | Something may be 'rational' either because it is required or because it is acceptable [Nagel] |
Full Idea: "Rational" may mean rationally required or rationally acceptable | |
From: Thomas Nagel (The View from Nowhere [1986], X.4) |
3784 | Duty prohibits some acts, whatever their consequences [Glover] |
Full Idea: The deontological view is that some acts are absolutely prohibited, regardless of consequences. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Introductions to Utilitarianism and its Critics [1990], Pt Five) |
3258 | If cockroaches can't think about their actions, they have no duties [Nagel] |
Full Idea: If cockroaches cannot think about what they should do, there is nothing they should do. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (The View from Nowhere [1986], VIII.3) |
3254 | If we can decide how to live after stepping outside of ourselves, we have the basis of a moral theory [Nagel] |
Full Idea: If we can make judgements about how we should live even after stepping outside of ourselves, they will provide the material for moral theory. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (The View from Nowhere [1986], VIII.1) |
3264 | We should see others' viewpoints, but not lose touch with our own values [Nagel] |
Full Idea: One should occupy a position far enough outside your own life to reduce the importance of the difference between yourself and other people, yet not so far outside that all human values vanish in a nihilistic blackout (i.e.aim for a form of humility). | |
From: Thomas Nagel (The View from Nowhere [1986], XI.2) |
3255 | We find new motives by discovering reasons for action different from our preexisting motives [Nagel] |
Full Idea: There are reasons for action, and we must discover them instead of deriving them from our preexisting motives - and in that way we can acquire new motives superior to the old. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (The View from Nowhere [1986], VIII.1) |
3782 | Satisfaction of desires is not at all the same as achieving happiness [Glover, by PG] |
Full Idea: Objections to utilitarianism as maximisation of preferences: faded past desires or the desires of the dead; obtaining desires and happiness are different; fewer desires are easier to satisfy; pain is good if it can be removed. | |
From: report of Jonathan Glover (Introductions to Utilitarianism and its Critics [1990], Pt Two) by PG - Db (ideas) |
3262 | Utilitarianism is too demanding [Nagel] |
Full Idea: Utilitarianism is too demanding. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (The View from Nowhere [1986], X.5) |
3787 | Rule-utilitarianism is either act-utilitarianism, or not really utilitarian [Glover] |
Full Idea: Rule-utilitarianism seems either to collapse into act-utilitarianism, or else it is only partly utilitarian. | |
From: Jonathan Glover (Introductions to Utilitarianism and its Critics [1990], Pt Six) |