display all the ideas for this combination of texts
3 ideas
| 22725 | When players don't meet again, defection is the best strategy [Axelrod] |
| Full Idea: When players will never meet again, the strategy of defection is the only stable strategy. | |
| From: Robert Axelrod (The Evolution of Co-Operation [1984], 5) | |
| A reaction: This gives good grounds for any community's mistrust of transient strangers, such as tourists. And yet any sensible tourist will want communities to trust tourists, and will therefore behave in a reliable way. |
| 22724 | Good strategies avoid conflict, respond to hostility, forgive, and are clear [Axelrod] |
| Full Idea: Successful game strategies avoid unnecessary conflict, are provoked by an uncalled for defection, forgive after a provocation, and behave clearly so the other player can adapt. | |
| From: Robert Axelrod (The Evolution of Co-Operation [1984], 1) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] Exactly what you would expect from a nice but successful school teacher. The strategies for success in these games is the same as the rules for educating a person into cooperative behaviour. TIT FOR TAT does all these. |
| 4580 | All virtues benefit either the public, or the individual who possesses them [Hume] |
| Full Idea: I desire you to consider if there be any quality that is virtuous, without having a tendency either to the public good or to the good of the person who possesses it. | |
| From: David Hume (Letters [1739], to Hutcheson 1739) | |
| A reaction: Obviously this is generally true. How, though, does it benefit the individual to secretly preserve their integrity? I go round to visit a friend to repay a debt; I am told they have died; I quietly leave some money on the table and leave. Why? |