Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Protagoras', 'The View from Nowhere' and 'Believing the Axioms I'
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9 ideas
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
188
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Socrates did not believe that virtue could be taught [Plato]
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Full Idea:
Socrates: I do not believe that virtue can be taught.
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From:
Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 320b)
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204
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Socrates is contradicting himself in claiming virtue can't be taught, but that it is knowledge [Plato]
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Full Idea:
Socrates is contradicting himself by saying virtue is not teachable, and yet trying to demonstrate that every virtue is knowledge.
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From:
Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 361b)
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189
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If we punish wrong-doers, it shows that we believe virtue can be taught [Plato]
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Full Idea:
Athenians inflict punishment on wrong-doers, which shows that they too think it possible to impart and teach goodness.
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From:
Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 324c)
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23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
3261
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Something may be 'rational' either because it is required or because it is acceptable [Nagel]
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Full Idea:
"Rational" may mean rationally required or rationally acceptable
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From:
Thomas Nagel (The View from Nowhere [1986], X.4)
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23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
3258
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If cockroaches can't think about their actions, they have no duties [Nagel]
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Full Idea:
If cockroaches cannot think about what they should do, there is nothing they should do.
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From:
Thomas Nagel (The View from Nowhere [1986], VIII.3)
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23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
3254
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If we can decide how to live after stepping outside of ourselves, we have the basis of a moral theory [Nagel]
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Full Idea:
If we can make judgements about how we should live even after stepping outside of ourselves, they will provide the material for moral theory.
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From:
Thomas Nagel (The View from Nowhere [1986], VIII.1)
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3264
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We should see others' viewpoints, but not lose touch with our own values [Nagel]
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Full Idea:
One should occupy a position far enough outside your own life to reduce the importance of the difference between yourself and other people, yet not so far outside that all human values vanish in a nihilistic blackout (i.e.aim for a form of humility).
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From:
Thomas Nagel (The View from Nowhere [1986], XI.2)
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23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
3255
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We find new motives by discovering reasons for action different from our preexisting motives [Nagel]
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Full Idea:
There are reasons for action, and we must discover them instead of deriving them from our preexisting motives - and in that way we can acquire new motives superior to the old.
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From:
Thomas Nagel (The View from Nowhere [1986], VIII.1)
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23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 3. Motivation for Altruism
3262
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Utilitarianism is too demanding [Nagel]
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Full Idea:
Utilitarianism is too demanding.
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From:
Thomas Nagel (The View from Nowhere [1986], X.5)
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