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Ideas for 'works (fragments)', 'Nietzsche's Immoralism' and 'Philosophy of Science'

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4 ideas

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
Zeno saw virtue as a splendid state, not just a source of splendid action [Zeno of Citium, by Cicero]
     Full Idea: Zeno held that not merely the exercise of virtue, as his predecessors held, but the mere state of virtue is in itself a splendid thing, although nobody possesses virtue without continuously exercising it.
     From: report of Zeno (Citium) (fragments/reports [c.294 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - Academica I.10.38
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
One of Zeno's books was 'That Which is Appropriate' [Zeno of Citium, by Long]
     Full Idea: Zeno of Citium wrote a (lost) book entitled 'That Which is Appropriate'.
     From: report of Zeno (Citium) (fragments/reports [c.294 BCE]) by A.A. Long - Hellenistic Philosophy 4.1
     A reaction: I cite this because I take it to be about what in Aristotle called 'the mean' - to emphasise that the mean is not what is average, or midway between the extremes, but what is a balanced response to each situation
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
Zeno says there are four main virtues, which are inseparable but distinct [Zeno of Citium, by Plutarch]
     Full Idea: Zeno (like Plato) admits a plurality of specifically different virtues, namely prudence, courage, sobriety, justice, which he takes to be inseparable but yet distinct and different from one another.
     From: report of Zeno (Citium) (fragments/reports [c.294 BCE]) by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1034c
     A reaction: In fact, the virtues are 'supervenient' on one another, which is the doctrine of the unity of virtue. Zeno is not a pluralist in the way Aristotle is - who says there are other goods apart from the virtues.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
The practice of justice may well need a recognition of human equality [Foot]
     Full Idea: I wonder whether the practice of justice may not absolutely require a certain recognition of equality between human beings, not a pretence of the equality of talents, but something deeper.
     From: Philippa Foot (Nietzsche's Immoralism [1991], p.152)
     A reaction: {My 'something deeper' is expressed by Foot in a quotation from Gertrude Stein]. This may well be the most fundamental division which runs across a society - between those who accept and those reject human equality.