display all the ideas for this combination of texts
83 ideas
| 34 | The good for man is an activity of soul in accordance with virtue [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The good for man is an activity of soul in accordance with virtue. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1098a13) | |
| A reaction: Although an 'activity of the soul' sounds like a mere state of mind, he emphasises that virtue requires action. 'Soul' here is more like 'the life' than the consciousness. |
| 5137 | Many pleasures are relative to a person, but some love what is pleasant by nature, and virtue is like that [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Lovers of beauty find pleasure in things that are pleasant by nature, and virtuous actions are of this kind, so that they are pleasant not only to a particular type of person but also in themselves. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1099a14) | |
| A reaction: An optimistic but crucial claim that virtue is dictated by nature, and so can't just be relative to individuals. The claim that some things are 'pleasant by nature', rather than just being liked by some individuals, is controversial but appealing. |
| 4342 | Aristotle must hold that virtuous King Priam's life can be marred, but not ruined [Hursthouse on Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: In discussing Priam, Aristotle, I take it, would allow that the virtuous person's life can be marred, but not, I think, ruined. | |
| From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1101a14) by Rosalind Hursthouse - On Virtue Ethics Ch.3 n11 | |
| A reaction: This seems right. At first it seems that Aristotle is saying that Priam's eudaimonia was utterly lost, but elsewhere he implies that this is impossible if the disaster is external to his character. |
| 4382 | Feelings are vital to virtue, but virtue requires choice, which feelings lack [Kosman on Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It seems perplexing in Aristotle that he apparently claims that virtues involve choice, while feelings do not. | |
| From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1104b10) by L.A. Kosman - Being Properly Affected p.110 | |
| A reaction: This captures the Kantian unease about Aristotle's theory. Presumably the answer is that choice comes into the training of the feelings, including self-training. Is choice involved in a dog trained to beg? |
| 54 | Actions are not virtuous because of their quality, but because of the way they are done [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Virtuous acts are not done justly or temperately because of their quality, but because they are done in a certain way. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1105a29) | |
| A reaction: These seems to be the contrast between correct behaviour because of a cold sense of duty (sometimes associatied with Kant), and the pleasure of acting with true virtue. |
| 58 | If virtues are not feelings or faculties, then they must be dispositions [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If virtues are neither feelings nor faculties, it remains that they are dispositions. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1106a10) | |
| A reaction: Makng virtues into dispositions connects his moral theory to his accounts of potentialities and powers in his physics. |
| 4373 | Virtue is the feeling of emotions that accord with one's perception of value [Achtenberg on Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: For Aristotle virtue is the acquisition of a developed capacity or tendency to experience emotion and desire accordantly with one's cognition of value. | |
| From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1106b16) by Deborah Achtenberg - Cognition of Value in Aristotle's Ethics 2.2 | |
| A reaction: Leaving still the problem of the criminal whose emotions correctly follow their warped values. An interesting point, nevertheless. |
| 63 | Virtue is a purposive mean disposition, which follows a rational principle and prudent judgment [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Virtue is a purposive disposition, lying in a mean that is relative to us and determined by a rational principle, and by that which a prudent man would use to determine it. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1107a01) | |
| A reaction: Presumably the last two are getting both the theory and the practice right. Are saying that virtues finds the appropriate mean, or that virtue IS the mean? Of what? |
| 5214 | Acts may be forgivable if particular facts (rather than principles) are unknown [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: What makes an act involuntary is not ignorance in the choice (which is a cause of wickedness), nor ignorance of the universal principle (which is blameable), but particular ignorance, of circumstances and objects. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1110b31) | |
| A reaction: The point here has to be that particular facts are much more significant in moral decisions than principles. This is the whole key to virtue theory - that principles are overruled by the facts of a situation, and only virtue can see you through. |
| 107 | A life of moral virtue brings human happiness, but not divine happiness [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Life in conformity with moral virtue will be happy in a secondary degree, because such activities are human (not divine). | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1178a10) | |
| A reaction: It seems a bit silly for a human being to aspire to 'divine' happiness. If contemplation is the eudaimonia of the gods, why does that mean that humans should aspire to it. Should cats try to play chess? |
| 5215 | There are six categories of particular cirumstance affecting an action [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Particular circumstances of an action can involve 1) the agent, 2) the act, 3) the object, and also sometimes 4) the instrument, 5) the aim, and 6) the manner. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1111a04) | |
| A reaction: 'Particular circumstances' are a crucial ingredient in virtue theory. It is interesting that 'the aim' (no.5) is only 'sometimes' a factor. Odd for a teleologist. Aristotle is interested in factors affecting decisions, and also excuses afterwards. |
| 5216 | An act is involuntary if the particular facts (esp. circumstances and effect) are unknown [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Anyone who is ignorant of any of the six factors affecting an action is considered to have acted involuntarily (especially the circumstances of the act, and its effect). | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1111a17) | |
| A reaction: This seems to concede that 'moral luck' may be an excuse. Cf. Idea 269. The big problem here is when someone offers one of the six types of ignorance as an excuse, and we feel they should have made the effort to know the facts. |
| 55 | People who perform just acts unwillingly or ignorantly are still not just [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Some people who perform just acts are still not just (for example, if the good act is done unwillingly or ignorantly). | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1144a10) | |
| A reaction: This is because virtue must be an 'activity of the soul'. The thought seems to be that the truly good action involves the commitment of the whole agent, not just a part of them. |
| 5149 | The two main parts of the soul give rise to two groups of virtues - intellectual, and moral [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Virtue is divided into classes in accordance with differentiations of the soul. Some are called 'intellectual' (e.g. wisdom, understanding, practical reason), others are called 'moral' (e.g. liberality or temperance). The latter are virtues of character. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1103a04) | |
| A reaction: Aristotle arrives at a rather sharp division, and hence a sharp division between two virtuous lifestyles, the social and the intellectual. His only overlap is practical reason ('phronesis'). My vision of the good life (and the soul) is more integrated. |
| 5156 | How can good actions breed virtues, if you need to be virtuous to perform good actions? [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: A difficulty with saying that people must perform just actions if they are to become just is that if they do what is just they must be just already, as they are already musical if they play music correctly. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1105a19) | |
| A reaction: Aristotle is himself voicing a charge often made against him (by Kantians and utilitarians). He goes on to rebut the charge, but there is still a problem (despite the benign circle of virtue-and-good-action), which is the familiar one of relativism. |
| 5157 | If a thing has excellence, this makes the thing good, and means it functions well [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Any kind of excellence renders that of which it is the excellence good, and makes it perform its function well; thus the excellence of the eye makes both the eye and its function good. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1106a17) | |
| A reaction: To say that a thing's excellence makes it good seems tautological to us, but Aristotle perceives a family of concepts (such as good, fine, excellent, and functioning well) which capture different psychological states. We need 'good', as well as 'right'. |
| 4369 | It is not universals we must perceive for virtue, but particulars, seen as intrinsically good [Aristotle, by Achtenberg] |
| Full Idea: Aristotle believes cognition of particulars is more important for virtue than cognition of universals, ..and I would add that it is cognition not just of particulars, but of their value, that is, perception of them as good or beautiful. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE]) by Deborah Achtenberg - Cognition of Value in Aristotle's Ethics Intro | |
| A reaction: This gets quickly to the heart of the problem, which is what fact about the particular is perceived which makes it good. Utilitarians are queueing up to answer this question. Interesting, though. |
| 5158 | Actions concern particular cases, and rules must fit the cases, not the other way round [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: When we are discussing actions, although general statements have a wider application, particular statements are closer to the truth. This is because actions are concerned with particular facts, and theories must be brought into harmony with these. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1107a29) | |
| A reaction: This implies criticism of Kant's whole theory, suggesting that there cannot be a universal law for most given situations. I take Aristotle's view to be (in modern terms) that a key virtue is sensitivity, taken as acute awareness of detail in a situation. |
| 5237 | We cannot properly judge by rules, because blame depends on perception of particulars [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is not easy to define by rule how, and how far, a person may go wrong before he incurs blame; because this depends upon particular circumstances, and the decision lies with our perception. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1126b04) | |
| A reaction: This is a key objection to Kantian approaches to morality. Aristotle does not flatly deny the role of rules (indeed, he is a great endorser of the law), but this shows why virtues of character are a better guide than rules can ever be. |
| 3548 | Aristotle neglects the place of rules in the mature virtuous person [Annas on Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Aristotle has not thought through the place of rules in the virtuous person's thought. He moves from the problem-solving of the learner to the immediate sensitivity of the fully virtuous without explaining the structure of the latter's thinking. | |
| From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE]) by Julia Annas - The Morality of Happiness 2.4 | |
| A reaction: Good point. If Kantians are all rules, then Aristotle is a very good corrective, but the fact is that many people live well by following good rules, or at least good guidelines. They can be taught (or written on a poster). |
| 5223 | We are partly responsible for our own dispositions and virtues [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Our virtues are voluntary, because we ourselves are in a sense partly responsible for our dispositions. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1114b21) | |
| A reaction: This seems half way to what we would now call existentialism. See Aristotle's other comments on natural virtue. The opposing view is Heraclitus's remark that "character is fate". |
| 4367 | Moral virtue is not natural, because its behaviour can be changed, unlike a falling stone [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: None of the moral virtues is engendered in us by nature, since nothing that is what it is by nature can be made to behave differently by habituation. For instance, a stone, which has a natural tendency downwards, cannot be habituated to rise. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1103a19) | |
| A reaction: Not much of an argument. Training a flower to grow up a drainpipe is not unnatural, but then the whole notion of 'unnatural' is hard to justify these days. |
| 4362 | Dispositions to virtue are born in us, but without intelligence they can be harmful [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is universally believed that we have a disposition for justice or temperance or courage from birth, but moral qualities are acquired in another way; natural dispositions are found in children and animals, but without intelligence they can be harmful. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1144b04) | |
| A reaction: An interesting argument, supporting the idea that moral virtue is not only teachable, but has to be taught, because it has an intellectual component. |
| 5225 | The end of virtue is what is right and honourable or fine [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The end of virtue is what is right and honourable ('kalon'). | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1115b14) | |
| A reaction: This wretched word 'kalon' (fine/beautiful/honourable) is at the heart of Aristotle's account, but many people think it is 'fine' for your family to avenge a murder, or to fearlessly commit a dangerous crime, or to be brazenly rude. |
| 56 | A person is good if they act from choice, and for the sake of the actions in themselves [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: A person is a good man when he does the acts from choice, and for the sake of the acts themselves. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1144a19) | |
| A reaction: Not sure about 'for the sake of the acts themselves'. A good deed might be something unpleasant, in order to achieve a generally desired end. An action might be right but not good. |
| 93 | Existence is desirable if one is conscious of one's own goodness [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: What makes existence desirable is the consciousness of one's own goodness, and such consciousness is pleasant in itself. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1170b09) | |
| A reaction: Nowadays we are much more conscious than Aristotle was of vanity as a vice, probably thanks to Christianity. The smugness of virtue signalling is especially annoying. But you see his point. |
| 44 | We acquire virtues by habitually performing good deeds [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: We become just by performing just acts, temperate by performing temperate ones, brave by performing brave ones. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1103b01) | |
| A reaction: This is the circularity which is sometimes criticised, but seems to be benign. When two good things reinforce one another, that is not a vicious circle. |
| 51 | True education is training from infancy to have correct feelings [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The importance of having been trained in some way from infancy to feel joy and grief at the right things; true education is precisely this. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1104b14) | |
| A reaction: I love this. I suspect the majority of parents neglect this, and allow children to indulge in feelings (both pro and anti) which will diminish them in later life. |
| 43 | Nature enables us to be virtuous, but habit develops virtue in us [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Moral virtues are neither by nor contrary to nature; we are constituted to receive them, but their full development is due to habit. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1103a21) | |
| A reaction: The notion of the habit of virtue is hugely important, precisely because such an idea is missing in Hobbes, Bentham and Kant. The concept of a true 'lady' or 'gentleman'. |
| 5152 | Like activities produce like dispositions, so we must give the right quality to the activity [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Like activities produce like dispositions; hence we must give our activities a certain quality, because it is their characteristics that determine the resulting dispositions. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1103b22) | |
| A reaction: Who doubts that a child brought up working for a charity would tend to be charitable, and one brought up amidst crime would tend to criminality? I just wish Aristotle could pin down the 'certain quality' the acts are supposed to have. 'Fine', I suppose. |
| 4378 | We must practise virtuous acts because practice actually teaches us the nature of virtue [Burnyeat on Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Aristotle is not giving us a bland reminder that virtue takes practice; rather, practice has cognitive powers, in that it is the way that we learn what is noble and just. | |
| From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1104b02) by Myles F. Burnyeat - Aristotle on Learning to be Good p.73 | |
| A reaction: Interesting. This seems right about Aristotle, and suggests that we come to appreciate the arts (for example) by doing them rather than studying them. (NE 1147a21) |
| 6793 | People can break into the circle of virtue and good action, by chance, or with help [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is possible to get started in virtuous action without being virtuous, just as it is in the arts; it is possible to put a few words together correctly by accident, or at the prompting of another person. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1105a24) | |
| A reaction: This is a crucial idea, applicable in many areas. Philosophers love to say that it is logically impossible to get started in something (e.g. scientific theory and scientific observation) because of circularity. But they are wrong. |
| 57 | We acquire virtue by the repeated performance of just and temperate acts [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is from the repeated performance of just and temperate acts that we acquire virtues. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1105b04) | |
| A reaction: Presumably one can endlessly compel a child or an employee or a slave to perform just and temperate acts, but still not generate the actual virtue. |
| 2690 | Associating with good people can be a training in virtue [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: A sort of training in virtue may result from associating with good people. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1170a12) | |
| A reaction: Aristotle doesn't say much about role models, but they strike me as basic to moral education. Good habits are largely acquired by copying. Teach the young to admire the right people. Not media celebrities! |
| 5222 | A person of good character sees the truth about what is actually fine and pleasant [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: What makes the man of good character stand out furthest is the fact that he sees the truth in every kind of situation: he is a sort of standard and yardstick of what is fine and pleasant. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1113a32) | |
| A reaction: A question for Aristotle seems to be whether practical reason ('phronesis') is sufficient to enable one to see what is truly fine and pleasant. Phronesis must crucially involve perception of values, and not just of what is expedient. |
| 4394 | People develop their characters through the activities they pursue [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: In every sphere of conduct people develop qualities corresponding to the activities that they pursue. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1114a07) | |
| A reaction: Correct. Hence the crucial thing for a good human life is the choice of activity when young. We can impose activity on the young, but the top aim of education is to teach people how to make good choices. ('Fat chance!' I hear you say..) |
| 5239 | When people speak of justice they mean a disposition of character to behave justly [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: When people speak of justice we see that they all mean that kind of state of character that disposes them to perform just acts, and behave in a just manner, and wish for what is just. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1129a07) | |
| A reaction: No remark shows more clearly that for the Greeks morality is a matter of character, rather than of actions or rules. This doesn't totally disagree with Plato's 'Republic', where justice turns out to be harmony in an individual person. |
| 4379 | It is very hard to change a person's character traits by argument [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is hard, if not impossible, to remove by argument the traits that have long since been incorporated in the character. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1179b18) | |
| A reaction: True, and a strong justification for Aristotle's approach, that the crucial element in morality is the early creation of character. But teachers can argue about what to teach. |
| 4386 | Character can be heroic, excellent, controlled, uncontrolled, bad, or brutish [Aristotle, by Urmson] |
| Full Idea: For Aristotle there are six possible states of character: heroic excellence, excellence, self-control, lack of self-control, badness of character, and brutishness. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1145a15) by J.O. Urmson - Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean p.158 | |
| A reaction: The two extremes are odd, but the distinction between bad and brutish is interesting, and the distinction between control and true excellence is vital (pace Kant). |
| 5250 | The three states of character to avoid are vice, 'akrasia' and brutishness [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: There are three kinds of states of character to be avoided: vice, 'akrasia' and brutishness. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1145a16) | |
| A reaction: The three are distinguished by the state of their reason: vice exhibits bad reason, akrasia exhibits right reason (but no control), and brutishness exhibits an absence of reason. A good distinction, which should be used to judge criminals. |
| 3545 | The mean implies that vices are opposed to one another, not to virtue [Aristotle, by Annas] |
| Full Idea: The doctrine of the mean claims that virtues are not the polar opposites of vices, but rather stand between two vices which are opposed. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1104a13) by Julia Annas - The Morality of Happiness 2.2 | |
| A reaction: I'm not sure about that. If the two extremes of courage are cowardice and recklessness, how are those two opposed to one another? |
| 47 | Virtues are destroyed by the excess and preserved by the mean [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Temperance and courage are destroyed by excess and deficiency and preserved by the mean. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1104a23) | |
| A reaction: It sounds as if drifting off into an excess, like binge drinking, is not just having a bad day, but actually 'destroys' the virtue. Presumably it permanently diminishes the good habit. |
| 4406 | Aristotle aims at happiness by depressing emotions to a harmless mean [Nietzsche on Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Moralities which aim at the promotion of individual 'happiness' do it with recipes to counter the passions….such as the depression of emotions to a harmless mean at which they may be satisfied, the Aristotelianism of morals. | |
| From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1104a24) by Friedrich Nietzsche - Beyond Good and Evil §198 | |
| A reaction: A serious error by Nietzsche, in which he confuses the mean with the virtue of temperance. The mean aims at appropriate emotion, not suppression. Extreme anger might be appropriate. What does Nietzsche think about inappropriate emotions? |
| 60 | The mean is relative to the individual (diet, for example) [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The mean is relative to US (as an average diet is too small for Milo the wrestler). | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1106a32) | |
| A reaction: Does that mean that if I am a dreadful coward, then achieving a tiny bit of courage will enough to qualify me as courageous? Surely there is something absolute (or external) about the required courage? |
| 61 | Skills are only well performed if they observe the mean [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Every science performs its function well only when it observes the mean. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1106b09) | |
| A reaction: Hm. Not sure what he has in mind. Most people aspire to perfection in their skills. The mean needs a continuum between two obvious extremes. |
| 4388 | One drink a day is moderation, but very drunk once a week could exhibit the mean [Urmson on Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The doctrine of the mean does not require the doctrine of moderation: if I say we should drink lots of alcohol once a week, but you propose a little each day, your view is more in line with moderation, but we can agree on the doctrine of the mean. | |
| From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1106b16) by J.O. Urmson - Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean p.162 | |
| A reaction: So two people could agree on the doctrine, but end up behaving differently. This is important for virtue theory. In a moral dilemma there might be several right things that could be done. |
| 4387 | In most normal situations it is not appropriate to have any feelings at all [Urmson on Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: In a normal context, if you invite me to dinner the appropriate amount of anger, pity, fear and confidence I should feel is none. | |
| From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1106b17) by J.O. Urmson - Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean p.160 | |
| A reaction: Not an objection to Aristotle, but an important point towards clarifying the doctrine of the mean, which is more to do with appropriateness than with having middling feelings. |
| 62 | We must tune our feelings to be right in every way [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: We must have feelings at the right times on the right grounds towards the right people for the right motive and in the right way. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1106b18) | |
| A reaction: And you thought feelings were just whatever comes naturally! We sometimes talk now of 'emotional intellgence', but we should talk more of 'educated emotions'. |
| 5159 | The mean is always right, and the extremes are always wrong [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: In all things the mean is to be commended, while the extremes are neither commendable nor right, but reprehensible. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1108a16) | |
| A reaction: This is the aspect of Aristotle which Nietzsche hated, as a stultifying conservativism seems to be implied. Elsewhere, though, Aristotle emphasises what is 'appropriate' (e.g. in anger) which allows the possibility of bolder and more exciting actions. |
| 65 | The vices to which we are most strongly pulled are most opposed to the mean [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is the things towards which we have the stronger natural inclination that seem to us more opposed to the mean….(e.g. pleasure). | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1109a12) | |
| A reaction: Trying to identify these might lead to a circularity (if strong opposition can only be identified by strong pull). If the pull varies with individuals, that implies that the opposition is also relative. |
| 5161 | To make one's anger exactly appropriate to a situation is very difficult [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is easy to get angry - anyone can do that - but to feel or act towards the right person to the right extent at the right time for the right reason in the right way - that is not easy, and it is not everyone that can do it. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1109a26) | |
| A reaction: This shows clearly that Aristotle's doctrine of the mean is NOT the same as the virtue of temperance (as Nietzsche seemed to think). Appropriate anger could be very forceful indeed, and bravery might be quite extreme in a particular crisis. |
| 5235 | Patient people are indignant, but only appropriately, as their reason prescribes [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Patience is commended, because a patient person tends to be unperturbed and not carried away by his feelings, but indignant only in the way and on the grounds and for the length of time that his 'logos' prescribes. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1125b33) | |
| A reaction: Because the word 'logos' is used here, this strikes me as Aristotle's best statement of his doctrine of the mean (which is never the middle way, but always the appropriate way). |
| 5238 | The sincere man is praiseworthy, because truth is the mean between boasting and irony [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Falsehood is bad and reprehensible, while the truth is a fine and praiseworthy thing; accordingly the sincere man, who hold the mean position, is praiseworthy, while both the deceivers (the boaster and the ironist) are to be censured. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1127a29) | |
| A reaction: An interesting and surprising claim - that truth is not an abstract Platonic absolute, but a human virtue seen as a mean between two extremes of falsehood (excessive assertion and excessive denial). Truth is a human value. |
| 5217 | At times we ought to feel angry, and we ought to desire health and learning [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: There are some things at which we actually ought to feel angry, and others that we actually ought to desire - health, for instance, and learning. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1111a29) | |
| A reaction: This is obviously an important part of virtue theory. Other theories are inclined to take our feelings as a given, and then offer rules for controlling and directing them. Emphasis on character can involve re-educating bad desires. |
| 5236 | It is foolish not to be angry when it is appropriate [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Those who do not get angry at things that ought to make them angry are considered to be foolish. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1126a05) | |
| A reaction: This remark most clearly shows that Nietzsche did not understand Aristotle, as he seemed to think that Aristotle was recommending bland restraint. Aristotle loves reason, but that does not mean that he admires boring tedium. |
| 64 | There is no right time or place or way or person for the committing of adultery; it is just wrong [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: No matter whether a man commits adultery with the right woman or at the right time or in the right way, because anything of that kind is simply wrong. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1107a18) | |
| A reaction: It would be nice if he gave a reason or a criterion for this opinion. Kekes says this points to something even more morally basic than virtue. Some acts should not even be considered. |
| 4117 | Nowadays we (unlike Aristotle) seem agreed that someone can have one virtue but lack others [Williams,B on Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: We accept, indeed regard as a platitude, an idea that Aristotle rejected, that someone can have one virtue while lacking others. | |
| From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE]) by Bernard Williams - Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy Ch.3 | |
| A reaction: Probably because we don't think as hard about it as Aristotle did. What are the prerequisites of even a single virtue? Distinguish a true virtue from an accidental good quality. |
| 5251 | Gods exist in a state which is morally superior to virtue [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: A god has no virtue or vice, any more than a brute has; the goodness of a god is more to be esteemed than virtue. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1145a24) | |
| A reaction: A very interesting comment, implying how very human the virtues are, with all the implied limitations. The virtues are just the natural excellences for a human, but this leaves open how naturally excellent the human race is. |
| 5240 | The word 'unjust' describes law-breaking and exploitation [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The word 'unjust' is considered to describe both one who breaks the law and one who takes advantage of another, i.e. acts unfairly. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1129a32) | |
| A reaction: Roughly, injustice is bad dealings with fellow citizens. We have 'distributive justice', and justice in keeping contracts. Our central meaning, of giving each citizen what they deserve, doesn't seem to be here. |
| 5261 | Between friends there is no need for justice [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Between friends there is no need for justice. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1155a26) | |
| A reaction: This is something like Aristotle's distinction between 'enkrateia' (control) and true virtue. It is an important point for those (usually on the left wing) who think that justice is the highest aim of a society. |
| 5151 | Justice concerns our behaviour in dealing with other people [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is the way that we behave in our dealings with other people that makes us just or unjust. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1103b16) | |
| A reaction: This makes clear that 'justice' for the Greeks concerns what we think of as basic morality, rather than legal distribution of pleasure or pain. It will be the Greek word 'dikaiosuné', which is the main topic of Plato's 'Republic'. |
| 4389 | What emotion is displayed in justice, and what are its deficiency and excess? [Urmson on Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Aristotle notoriously has difficulty in finding the specific emotion that is displayed in just and unjust actions, and equal difficulty in distinguishing the two errors of deficiency and excess required by the doctrine of the mean. | |
| From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1129a03) by J.O. Urmson - Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean p.164 | |
| A reaction: Not a criticism of Aristotle, but it opens up the complexity of his view. It seems to make justice a super-virtue, a combination of lesser sets of combined mean and right feeling. Maybe. |
| 23556 | Particular justice concerns specific temptations, but universal justice concerns the whole character [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Beside universal justice there is particular justice, with the same name. ...Particular injustice concerns honour or money or security, and is actuated by the pleasure that the advantage offers, but universal justice has the same field as the good man. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1130b01) | |
| A reaction: Miranda Fricker finds this distinction in testimonial justice, and implies that most virtues divide in this way. |
| 5242 | Justice is whatever creates or preserves social happiness [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: We call 'just' anything that tends to produce or conserve the happiness of a political association. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1129b18) | |
| A reaction: This is closer to a modern view, though we probably think that some societies might flourish while being unjust, while others might be very just but disintegrate. We are more cynical than Aristotle. |
| 5226 | True courage is an appropriate response to a dangerous situation [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The man who faces or fears the right things for the right reason and in the right way and at the right time is courageous. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1115b18) | |
| A reaction: This is the consistent view of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. Their concept is much broader and more value-laden than ours. We are inclined to see courage as simply being undeterred by pain, and place the morality elsewhere. |
| 5224 | Strictly speaking, a courageous person is one who does not fear an honourable death [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: In the strict sense of the word the courageous man will be one who is fearless in the face of an honourable death, or of some sudden threat of death. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1115a33) | |
| A reaction: I.e. one is rightly afraid of a DIShonourable death. This seems to be more of a touchstone than a definition. Presumably one can show true courage in the face of pain as well as of death. |
| 24 | Honour depends too much on the person who awards it [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Honour is felt to depend more on those who confer than on him who receives it. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1095b22) | |
| A reaction: That presumably means that honour is not only highly relative (much more so than a society's other virtues), but that the persons awarding the honours are highly biased. See the absurd UK House of Lords. |
| 5233 | Honour is clearly the greatest external good [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Honour is clearly the greatest external good. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1123b20) | |
| A reaction: Honour was earlier dismissed as 'the good', largely because it depended on other people. It is not far off to say that the aim of Aristotle's theory is to achieve genuine and justified honour. One's 'eudaimonia' is judged by others too. |
| 4119 | If you aim at honour, you make yourself dependent on the people to whom you wish to be superior [Aristotle, by Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: People who aim at political honour tend to defeat themselves by making themselves dependent on those to whom they aim to be superior (what might be called the 'Coriolanus Paradox'). | |
| From: report of Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1095b25) by Bernard Williams - Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy Ch.3 | |
| A reaction: This brings out Aristotle's point nicely. This is why aristocrats withdraw behind their fences, among small coteries of accolytes. |
| 105 | We should aspire to immortality, and live by what is highest in us [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: We ought, so far as in us lies, to put on immortality, and do all that we can to live in conformity with the highest that is in us. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1177b33) | |
| A reaction: This high/low picture should be treated with caution. 'Be a good animal, true to your animal self', says a D.H. Lawrence character. Why aspire to what is unattainable? |
| 111 | The more people contemplate, the happier they are [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The more people contemplate, the happier they are. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1178b29) | |
| A reaction: On the other hand he regularly says that virtues concern actions, not thoughts. He sees slavery as essential to allow others to contemplate, but feeling guilty about that would ruin it. |
| 104 | Contemplation (with the means to achieve it) is the perfect happiness for man [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Contemplation (with enough self-sufficiency, leisure and energy) is the perfect happiness for man. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1177b17) | |
| A reaction: I assume this is successful and elevating contemplation, rather than sinking into depression as one contemplates human folly and wickedness. Stick to anodyne contemplations? |
| 18229 | Only contemplation is sought for its own sake; practical activity always offers some gain [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: This activity [contemplation] alone would seem to be loved for its own sake; for nothing arises from it apart from the contemplating, while from practical activities we gain more or less apart from the activity. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1177b), quoted by Christine M. Korsgaard - Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value 8 'Finality' | |
| A reaction: Not true. Gardening, walking, travelling, chatting with friends, reading. I'm shocked that he should say this. |
| 5272 | The intellectual life is divine in comparison with ordinary human life [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If the intellect is divine compared with man, the life of the intellect must be divine compared with the life of a human being. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1177b31) | |
| A reaction: This raises an interesting question: what, for Aristotle, was the value of a human life? This raises a meta-question for virtue theory, because the latter only concerns itself with excellence for humans? What is the value of a slug? |
| 18232 | The gods live, but action is unworthy of them, so that only leaves contemplation? [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The circumstances of action would be found trivial and unworthy of gods. ...Still, everyone supposes that they live and are therefore active. ...Now if you take away from a living being action, and still more production, what is left but contemplation? | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1178b), quoted by Christine M. Korsgaard - Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value 8 'Finality' | |
| A reaction: Is the ideal life for a human being to be paralysed by injury, and hence capable of nothing except godlike contemplation? |
| 110 | Lower animals cannot be happy, because they cannot contemplate [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The lower animals have no share in happiness, being completely incapable of contemplation. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1178b25) | |
| A reaction: I've heard it suggested that the recipe for human happiness is to be good looking and rather dim. Very few people can be seriously good at contemplation. |
| 5138 | The fine deeds required for happiness need external resources, like friends or wealth [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It seems clear that happiness needs the addition of external goods, for it is difficult if not impossible to do fine deeds without any resources; many can only be done by the help of friends, or wealth, or political influence. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1099a32) | |
| A reaction: One should ask what fine deeds can be done without external resources, and also what corruptions of virtue result from the pursuit of external goods (esp. political influence!). Aristotle wants to DO good, where Stoics want to BE good. |
| 38 | A man can't be happy if he is ugly, or of low birth, or alone and childless [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: A man is scarcely happy if he is very ugly to look at, or of low birth, or solitary and childless. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1099b03) | |
| A reaction: This seems a bit shocking for us, when none of these setbacks is the person's fault. Socrates was said to be ugly, and Plato seems to have had no children. |
| 1665 | It is nonsense to say a good person is happy even if they are being tortured or suffering disaster [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Those who say that a man who is being tortured and has suffered terrible calamities is happy if he is a good man are willy-nilly talking nonsense. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1153b19) | |
| A reaction: Someone expressed this extreme idea, and the Stoics sympathised with it. Happiness is life going well. Making a supreme sacrifice for an enormous good seems like life going well. |
| 108 | The virtue of generosity requires money [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The liberal man will need money to perform liberal acts. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1178a28) | |
| A reaction: The sort of thing Margaret Thatcher used to say, with a passive aggressive tone. The virtue also needs someone to be short of money. The paradox of virtue - that bad situations are needed, to give them opportunities. |
| 2686 | Aristotle does not confine supreme friendship to moral heroes [Cooper,JM on Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: I argue that Aristotle does not make friendship of the central kind the exclusive preserve of moral heroes, and that he does not maintain that friendships of the derivative kinds are wholly self-centered. | |
| From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1155a03-) by John M. Cooper - Aristotle on Friendship p.305 | |
| A reaction: Glad to hear it. Though he does seem to think that only virtuous people can have true friendships. He sees friendship as the cement of a good society, so it has to be fairly widespread. |
| 2687 | For Aristotle in the best friendships the binding force is some excellence of character [Cooper,JM on Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: For Aristotle what makes a friendship a virtue-friendship is the binding force within it of some - perhaps for all that partial and incomplete - excellence of the character. | |
| From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1156b10) by John M. Cooper - Aristotle on Friendship p.308 | |
| A reaction: It is certainly hard to imagine a really good friendship that doesn't involve mutual respect, and possibly even mutual admiration. |
| 85 | Bad men can have friendships of utility or pleasure, but only good men can be true friends [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Where the object is pleasure or utility friendship is possible between bad men,…but obviously only good men can be friends for their own sakes. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1157a16) | |
| A reaction: If bad men try to be friends, they presumably become aware of the vices in the other person, and vices are usually fairly unfriendly. |