display all the ideas for this combination of texts
11 ideas
23107 | Prosperity is a higher social virtue than justice [Kekes] |
Full Idea: If social institutions were to have a first virtue, …prosperity would be a much stronger candidate that justice. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 06.3) | |
A reaction: Kekes occasionally pays lip service to ecological issues, but this shows he is not serious. Endless economic growth will kill our planet, so it should never be our prime virtue. Also the impplication that you can't be too prosperous is plainly false. |
1566 | The first priority in elections is to vote for people who support democracy [Anon (Diss)] |
Full Idea: A lottery is not democratic, because every state contains people who are not democratic, and if the lottery chooses them they will destroy the democracy. People should elect those who are observed to favour democracy. | |
From: Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §7) |
23081 | Liberal basics are pluralism, freedom, rights, equality, and distributive justice - for autonomy [Kekes] |
Full Idea: The basic liberal values are pluralism, freedom, rights, equality, and distributive justice. What makes them basically valuable is that they enable individuals to live autonomously. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 01.2) | |
A reaction: Helpful. Kekes identifies respect for autonomy as the single value which unites all liberal doctrines (and he traces it back to Kant). |
23085 | The key liberal values are explained by the one core value, which is autonomy [Kekes] |
Full Idea: Liberals regard pluralism, freedom, rights, equality and distributive justice as basic …but this particular group of values is explained by the true core of liberalism, the inner citadel for whose protection all the liberal battles are waged: autonomy. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 01.5) | |
A reaction: Given that children, soldiers, monks and nuns, and people in old folks homes have very limited autonomy, it is reasonable to query whether it really is so important. I like autonomy if I have external power over my life; not so good when in hospital. |
23092 | Agents have little control over the capacities needed for liberal autonomy [Kekes] |
Full Idea: It is important [for liberals] to realise that agents have no control over their possession of the capacities and opportunities on which their autonomy depends. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 03.2) | |
A reaction: It can be replied to Kekes that they also have little control over the capacities upon which his prized 'desert' depends. It may be an axiom of all modern political thought that people have less control than we imagine. |
23102 | Liberals are egalitarians, but in varying degrees [Kekes] |
Full Idea: All liberals are egalitarians, though they may be more or less so. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 05.1) | |
A reaction: In the broadest view, this may be the one thing which distinguishes generalised liberals from the rest. To reject it needs a basis for the rejection, and every basis for its flat rejection is anathema to liberals. |
23084 | Are egalitarians too coercive, or not egalitarian enough, or lax over morality? [Kekes] |
Full Idea: Egalitarian liberalism is criticised by classical [freedom] liberals for its coercive redistribution, by socialist liberals for not being egalitarian enough, and by conservative liberals for abandoning moral standards in the guise of neutrality. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 01.4) | |
A reaction: Income tax is 'coercive' distribution, but it is done with general consent in most liberal democracies. An interesting line between the needs of the state and the needs of its most needy citizens. |
23079 | Liberal justice ignores desert, which is the essence of justice [Kekes] |
Full Idea: The liberal conception of justice …excludes the essence of justice: desert. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], Pref) | |
A reaction: Certainly our normal concept of justice includes such thoughts as 'serves him right'. The trouble with the Kekes view is his society is continually morally judging people, and most people's grounds for that are fairly irrational. It's why we have courts. |
23091 | Why do liberals not see a much wider range of values as basic? [Kekes] |
Full Idea: Why are prosperity, order, civility, peace, a healthy environment, security, happiness, and law-abidingness not as important as those thought of by liberals as basic? | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 02.5) | |
A reaction: This presumes that liberals only see a narrow core of values as basic to the structure of the society. Presumably every society should be well disposed towards the nice features listed here. Would their absence wreck the society? |
23112 | Liberals ignore contingency, and think people are good and equal, and institutions cause evil [Kekes] |
Full Idea: Liberals comfortably believe that autonomy minimises contingency, that humans are disposed to the good, that wickedness is due to remediable institutions, and that humans are morally equal because of their autonomy. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 07.4) | |
A reaction: In a nutshell, Kekes thinks liberals are naïve. That institutions cause evil sounds more Marxist than liberal. When individuals become evil, it is reasonable for us to think that this need not have been the case. |
23082 | Liberal distribution cares more about recipients than donors [Kekes] |
Full Idea: Liberal distribution cares more about the rights of the recipients than the rights of the donors. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 01.2) | |
A reaction: Even if you are very left wing indeed, this is an important point. A society dominated by a powerful Robin Hood (steal from the rich, for the poor) is quite likely to end in civil war. But should society allow huge individual wealths to accumulate? |