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20598
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In a democracy, which 'people' are included in the decision process? [Tuckness/Wolf]
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Full Idea:
In any democratic state, who are 'the people' who get to rule themselves? That is, who gets to participate in the public decision process, and who is excluded?
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From:
Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 5 'What is')
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A reaction:
In the modern world this may be clear-cut when a democracy gets started, but people move around so much more that every democracy is faced with new types of residents. Then there is age, criminality, mental health...
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20596
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For global justice, adopt rules without knowing which country you will inhabit [Tuckness/Wolf]
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Full Idea:
Imagine a new original position where we adopted rules for global justice without knowing which country we would inhabit.
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From:
Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 4 'Cosmopolitan')
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A reaction:
Nice question. North Korea!! Rawls says it is only within a nation, because there is a co-operative enterprise going on. That is, I presume, that the choosers involved are a 'people'. See Kant's 'Perpetual Peace' for an alternative.
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20593
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The veil of ignorance ensures both fairness and unanimity [Tuckness/Wolf]
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Full Idea:
The veil of ignorance ensures that the original position is fair, but it also guarantees that agreement will be unanimous (which would be impossible if each person insisted that justice should match her own conception).
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From:
Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 4 'Original')
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A reaction:
Not clear about this. If I choose very cautiously, but others choose very riskily, and they win, why I should I fall in with their unanimity? That can only be if we agree to be unanimous in backing the result. Like a democratic election?
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20608
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Unjust institutions may be seen as just; are they legitimate if just but seen as unjust? [Tuckness/Wolf]
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Full Idea:
Legitimacy and perceived legitimacy do not always go together: people can believe that their institutions are just, but they may be wrong. Is the reverse also possible? Can institutions be legitimate if people believe they are not?
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From:
Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 5 'What are')
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A reaction:
Nice thoughts. An institution cannot be just merely because it is seen that way (if someone gets away with rigging an election). If they are just but seen as unjust, I presume they are legitimate (which is objective), but disfunctional.
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20597
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If winning elections depends on wealth, we have plutocracy instead of democracy [Tuckness/Wolf]
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Full Idea:
If we let people's influence on election outcomes depend on their wealth, then we don't have a democracy any more. We have a plutocracy, where the people who have all the wealth have all the political power too.
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From:
Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 5 'Intro')
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A reaction:
[see Michael Walzer on 'complex equality'] This is startling true in the United States, but still somewhat true elsewhere. Being wealthy enough to control the media is the key in modern democracies.
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20600
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Which areas of public concern should be decided democratically, and which not? [Tuckness/Wolf]
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Full Idea:
Are there areas which are excluded from democratic decision making? Or should all issues of public concern be decided through a democratic process?
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From:
Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 5 'What is')
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A reaction:
Crucially, are we discussing direct democracy, or representative democracy? In Britain all major decisions are made by the cabinet. Our representatives appoint leaders, who then appoint the decision makers. Judiciary is non-democratic.
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20609
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If several losing groups would win if they combine, a runoff seems called for [Tuckness/Wolf]
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Full Idea:
It is possible that the people who supported several losing candidates might have joined forces and had a majority. For that reason, many countries have a runoff election.
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From:
Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 5 'Does democracy')
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A reaction:
The problem is that there is no rationale as to who stands in an election. If their views are evenly spread, the first result seems OK. If there are five left-wingers and one right-winger, a runoff seems to be produce a more just result.
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20599
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How should democratic votes be aggregated? Can some person's votes count for more? [Tuckness/Wolf]
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Full Idea:
A major question for democracy is how are the contributions of different people aggregated into a collective decision? Must votes have equal weight and consideration, or is it permissible for different people's votes to count differently?
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From:
Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 5 'What is')
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A reaction:
Mill hoped that wise and knowledgeable people would have a strong influence over the others, but we have recently moved into the post-truth era, where we are swamped by bogus facts. Does that strengthen the case for elite voting?
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20613
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We have obligations to our family, even though we didn't choose its members [Tuckness/Wolf]
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Full Idea:
Many of our most important obligations are things we did not consent to. If you think you have obligations to your family, did you choose to have them as family members?
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From:
Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 6 'Gratitude')
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A reaction:
A question that gets close to the heart of the communitarian ideal, I think. We choose to have children, and we bring them up, but even then we don't choose who our children are.
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