display all the ideas for this combination of texts
3 ideas
21412 | Humans are distinguished from animals by their capacity to set themselves any sort of end [Kant] |
Full Idea: The capacity to set oneself an end - any end whatsoever - is what characterises humanity (as distinguished from animality). | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 392 Intro VIII) | |
A reaction: This appears to exclude animals which hunt, or build nests - but we have now hugely closed the gap between humans and other animals. I like this, because it chimes in with Sandel's Idea 21045. |
21435 | Man is both social, and unsociable [Kant] |
Full Idea: Man is a being meant for society (though he is also an unsociable one). | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 471 I.II) | |
A reaction: A striking contrast with Aristotle in Idea 5133. It is the difference between the communitarian and the liberal views of society. The latter values privacy and good fences. |
20842 | Rational animals begin uncorrupted, but externals and companions are bad influences [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: The rational animal is corrupted, sometimes because of the persuasiveness of external activities and sometimes because of the influence of companions. For the starting points provided by nature are uncorrupted. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.89 | |
A reaction: If companions corrupt us, what corrupted the companions? Aren't we all in this together? And where do the 'external activities' originate? |