Combining Texts

Ideas for 'works', 'Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn)' and 'A Short History of Ethics'

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12 ideas

25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
If everyone owned himself, that would prevent slavery [Kymlicka]
     Full Idea: The best way to prevent enslavement of one person to another is to give each person ownership over himself.
     From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 4.2.c)
     A reaction: [The idea comes from Nozick, but Kymlicka is assessing how it should be understood] The best way to block any social evil like slavery is to make it unthinkable. Legislation is second best. Presumably I could sell myself into slavery (like Faust)?
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 4. Free market
Libertarians like the free market, but they also think that the free market is just [Kymlicka]
     Full Idea: Not everyone who favours the free market is a libertarian, for they do not all share the libertarian view that the free market is inherently just.
     From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 4.1.a)
     A reaction: Illuminating. It would appear that exploitation is possible within a strictly free market, so it seems unlikely that free markets are inherently just (unless you don't acknowledge that 'exploitation' is wrong).
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
The most valuable liberties to us need not be the ones with the most freedom [Kymlicka]
     Full Idea: Different liberties promote different interests for many different reasons, and there is no reason to assume that the liberties which are most valuable to us are the ones with the most freedom.
     From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 2.4.a.iii)
     A reaction: As I grow older I come more and more to think that freedom is overvalued. But have you tried the other thing? We complacently take huge freedoms for granted. Be passionate about fundamental freedoms, and relaxed about the rest.
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 6. Political freedom
Ancient freedom was free participation in politics, not private independence of life [Kymlicka]
     Full Idea: The liberty of the ancients was their active participation in the exercise of political power, not the peaceful enjoyment of personal independence.
     From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 7.2.a)
     A reaction: Interesting. It takes a feat of imagination to grasp a world where the desire for freedom to sit at home and compile a database of philosophical ideas never even crossed anyone's mind.
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 2. Political equality
Equal opportunities seems fair, because your fate is from your choices, not your circumstances [Kymlicka]
     Full Idea: The ideology of equal opportunity seems fair to many people in our society because it ensures that people's fate is determined by their choices, rather than their circumstances.
     From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 3.2)
     A reaction: Is it that we surmise that people have 'free will', and then engineer a situation where it can be exercised? Is it that the rest of us don't want to feel guilty when someone else's life goes awry (because it was 'their fault')?
Equal opportunity arbitrarily worries about social circumstances, but ignores talents [Kymlicka]
     Full Idea: The prevailing view [of equal opportunity] only recognises differences in social circumstances, while ignoring differences in natural talents (or treating them as if they were a choice). This is an arbitrary limit on the theory's central intuition.
     From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 3.2)
     A reaction: Of course we (society) can do a lot about your social circumstances, but very little about your talents, other than to develop them or thwart them. Talented children need more than mere 'opportunity'.
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 3. Legal equality
Marxists say justice is unneeded in the truly good community [Kymlicka]
     Full Idea: Marxists believe that justice, far from being the first virtue of social institutions, is something that the truly good community has no need for.
     From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 5.1)
     A reaction: This seems to imply that in the truly good community there are nothing but truly good individuals, which is taking social determinism to its limits. Are all the citizens of a bad community inherently bad?
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Fans of natural rights or laws can't agree on what the actual rights or laws are [MacIntyre]
     Full Idea: It is notorious that adherents of theories about natural rights or natural laws offer lists of rights or laws which differ in substance from each other.
     From: Alasdair MacIntyre (A Short History of Ethics [1967], Ch.17)
     A reaction: There seems to have been a consensus early on that self-defence was a natural right, but divergence presumably occurs when you get bolder and more complex. There is a lot of divergence over which is Shakespeare's best play.
The Lockean view of freedom depends on whether you had a right to what is restricted [Kymlicka]
     Full Idea: The Lockean camp defines freedom in terms of the exercise of our rights. Whether or not a restriction decreases our freedom depends on whether or not we had a right to do the restricted thing.
     From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 2.4.a.iii)
     A reaction: My first instinct is to be sympathetic to this, since a detached and general notion of 'freedom' strikes me as suspect. He offers the rival 'Spenserian' view of freedom as just having the choice.
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
Justice corrects social faults, but also expresses respect to individuals as ends [Kymlicka]
     Full Idea: Justice is more than a remedial virtue. It does remedy defects in social co-ordination, ...but it also expresses the respect individuals are owed as ends in themselves, not as mean's to someone's good, or even to the common good.
     From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 5.1)
     A reaction: That is, I take it, that justice operates at two different levels in our theoretical social thinking.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / a. Aims of education
It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain an idea without accepting it [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain an idea without accepting it.
     From: Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE])
     A reaction: The epigraph on a David Chalmers website. A wonderful remark, and it should be on the wall of every beginners' philosophy class. However, while it is in the spirit of Aristotle, it appears to be a misattribution with no ancient provenance.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Aristotle said the educated were superior to the uneducated as the living are to the dead [Aristotle, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Aristotle was asked how much educated men were superior to those uneducated; "As much," he said, "as the living are to the dead."
     From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 05.1.11