Combining Texts

Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Papancasudani' and 'The Ethics'

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8 ideas

25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
Slavery is a disgraceful crime [Spinoza]
     Full Idea: Slavery is a disgraceful crime.
     From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], IVApp 21)
     A reaction: Note the date of this - when the slave trade is just getting going, and long before it is threatened or criticised.
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
Justice, the law, and right reason are natural and not conventional [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Chrysippus says (in On the Honourable) that justice is natural and not conventional, as are the law and right reason.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.128
     A reaction: How does he explain variations in the law between different states? Presumably some of them have got it wrong. What is the criterion for deciding which laws are natural?
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
The best use of talent is to teach other people to live rationally [Spinoza]
     Full Idea: There is nothing by which a person can better show how much skill and talent he possesses than by so educating men that at last they will live under the direct authority of reason.
     From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], IVApp 09)
     A reaction: Speaking as a retired philosophy teacher, I think this is an excellent idea, but then I would, wouldn't I? What if you turn a nice warm-hearted friendly young person into a chillingly detached heartless reasoner?
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 1. Causing Death
Human killing is worse if the victim is virtuous [Buddhaghosa]
     Full Idea: In the case of humans killing is the more blameworthy the more virtuous the victim is.
     From: Buddhaghosa (Papancasudani [c.400], 9.7-10)
     A reaction: This sentiment has almost become a taboo in western society, and yet it is present all the time. The greatest outcry is about murders of really good citizens. Occasionally the murder of a villain causes little regret.
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
It is impossible that the necessity of a person's nature should produce a desire for non-existence [Spinoza]
     Full Idea: That a man, from the necessity of his own nature, should endeavour to become non-existent, is as impossible as that something should be made out of nothing.
     From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], IV Pr 20)
     A reaction: At first glance this is very paradoxical, but it fits with evolutionary theory, which seems to make it almost inconceivable to naturally desire suicide. The desire to live is universal, and only circumstances can create an artifiical contradictory desire.
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
We don't have obligations to animals as they aren't like us [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: We have no obligations of justice to other animals, because they are dissimilar to us.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.Ze.66
     A reaction: "Dissimilar" begs questions. Some human beings don't seem much like me. How are we going to treat visiting aliens?
Justice is irrelevant to animals, because they are too unlike us [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: There is no justice between us and other animals because of the dissimilarity between us and them.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.129
     A reaction: [from lost On Justice Bk 1] What would he make of modern revelations about bonobos and chimpanzees? If there is great dissimilarity between some peoples, does that invalidate justice between them? He also said animals exist for our use.
Animals feel, but that doesn't mean we can't use them for our pleasure and profit [Spinoza]
     Full Idea: I by no means deny that brutes feel, but I do deny that on this account it is unlawful for us to consult our own profit by using them for our own pleasure and treating them as is most convenient for us, inasmuch as they do not agree in nature with us.
     From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], IV Pr 37)
     A reaction: Something a bit chilling about this. What if I decided that some people did 'not agree with my nature'? Presumably pleasure includes hunting? What was his attitude to bear-baiting?