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Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Ideas: intro to pure phenomenology' and 'On the Law of War and Peace'

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8 ideas

25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 7. Freedom to leave
A person is free to renounce their state, as long as it is not a moment of crisis [Grotius, by Rousseau]
     Full Idea: Grotius thinks that each person can renounce his state and leave the country. (n15: provided it is not to evade one's duty the moment the homeland needs us; this would be criminal and punishable; it would not be withdrawal, but desertion)
     From: report of Hugo Grotius (On the Law of War and Peace [1625]) by Jean-Jacques Rousseau - The Social Contract (tr Cress) III.18
     A reaction: The obvious example is Britons going to America in 1939, or (more controversially) conscripts going to Canada to avoid fighting in Vietnam. I'm unclear whether the idea in the note is that of Grotius or of Rousseau). Is tax exile OK, then?
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
Justice, the law, and right reason are natural and not conventional [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Chrysippus says (in On the Honourable) that justice is natural and not conventional, as are the law and right reason.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.128
     A reaction: How does he explain variations in the law between different states? Presumably some of them have got it wrong. What is the criterion for deciding which laws are natural?
Grotius and Pufendorf based natural law on real (rather than idealised) humanity [Grotius, by Ford,JD]
     Full Idea: Grotius and Pufendorf transformed the natural law tradition by starting from identifiable traits of human nature rather than ideas about what human beings ought to be.
     From: report of Hugo Grotius (On the Law of War and Peace [1625]) by J.D. Ford - Pufendorf, Samuel p.863
A natural right of self-preservation is balanced by a natural law to avoid unnecessary harm [Grotius, by Tuck]
     Full Idea: For Grotius, there was a fundamental 'natural right' of self-preservation upon which all known moralities and codes of social behaviour must have been constructed, but it is balanced by a fundament duty or 'natural law' to abstain from harming others.
     From: report of Hugo Grotius (On the Law of War and Peace [1625]) by Richard Tuck - Hobbes Ch.2
     A reaction: This theory has the virtue of economy, but I don't see how you can clearly justify those particular natural rights and laws, without allowing others to creep in, such as a right to a decent share of food, or a law requiring some fairness.
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / d. Legal positivism
Grotius ignored elaborate natural law theories, preferring a basic right of self-preservation [Grotius, by Tuck]
     Full Idea: Grotius said there was a minimum core of morality (based on self-preservation), and disregarded the elaborate accounts of principles of natural law which Aristotelians had always sought to develop.
     From: report of Hugo Grotius (On the Law of War and Peace [1625]) by Richard Tuck - Hobbes Ch.1
     A reaction: Aquinas would be the key Aristotelian here. I tend towards the Aristotelian view. If you go for the minimal view, it is not clear why there is a 'right' to self-preservation, rather than a mere desire for it.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / b. Justice in war
It is permissible in a just cause to capture a place in neutral territory [Grotius]
     Full Idea: It is permissible for one who is waging a just war to take possession of a place situated in a country free from hostilities.
     From: Hugo Grotius (On the Law of War and Peace [1625], II.ii.x), quoted by Michael Walzer - Just and Unjust Wars 15 n
     A reaction: This rejects Combatant Equality, allowing the just to do what is morally forbidden to the unjust.
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
We don't have obligations to animals as they aren't like us [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: We have no obligations of justice to other animals, because they are dissimilar to us.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.Ze.66
     A reaction: "Dissimilar" begs questions. Some human beings don't seem much like me. How are we going to treat visiting aliens?
Justice is irrelevant to animals, because they are too unlike us [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: There is no justice between us and other animals because of the dissimilarity between us and them.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.129
     A reaction: [from lost On Justice Bk 1] What would he make of modern revelations about bonobos and chimpanzees? If there is great dissimilarity between some peoples, does that invalidate justice between them? He also said animals exist for our use.