display all the ideas for this combination of texts
25 ideas
19913 | A master forfeits ownership of slaves he abandons [Locke] |
Full Idea: A master forfeits the dominion over his slaves whom he hath abandoned. | |
From: John Locke (Second Treatise of Government [1690], 237) | |
A reaction: How often did slave owners take a day off, I wonder? Presumably slaves will take back their freedom, even if the masters haven't 'forfeited' their ownership, so Locke's point is fairly academic. |
19870 | If you try to enslave me, you have declared war on me [Locke] |
Full Idea: He who makes an attempt to enslave me thereby puts himself into a state of war with me. | |
From: John Locke (Second Treatise of Government [1690], 017) | |
A reaction: So presumably actual slaves are in a state of permanent war with their owners. What of a woman who is enslaved by her husband? |
19883 | Slaves captured in a just war have no right to property, so are not part of civil society [Locke] |
Full Idea: Slave are captives taken in a just war, and by right of Nature subjected to the absolute dominion and arbitrary power of their masters. ...Being not capable of any property, they cannot in that state be considered any part of civil society. | |
From: John Locke (Second Treatise of Government [1690], 085) | |
A reaction: If the test of citizenship is being capable of holding property, presumably children and mentally damaged people (including the very old) will also fail to qualify. I see no principled reason why slaves should not be allowed to vote. Note 'just' war. |
19871 | Freedom is not absence of laws, but living under laws arrived at by consent [Locke] |
Full Idea: Liberty of man in society is to be under no other legislative power but that established by consent in the commonwealth. Freedom is not (as Filmer suggests) doing what you please while not tied by any laws. | |
From: John Locke (Second Treatise of Government [1690], 022) | |
A reaction: That sounds plausible if the consent is unanimous, but a minority is not free if the laws made by a large majority are a sort of persecution. |
19880 | All value depends on the labour involved [Locke] |
Full Idea: It is labour that puts the difference of value on everything. ...Whatever bread is worth more than acorns, wine than water, that is wholly owing to labour and industry. | |
From: John Locke (Second Treatise of Government [1690], 040) | |
A reaction: In capitalism this is nonsense. Supply and demand fix all the values. Locke has slid from labour bestowing ownership to labour bestowing value. No one gets paid on the basis of how hard they work, except on piece rates. |
19873 | We all own our bodies, and the work we do is our own [Locke] |
Full Idea: Every man has a 'property' in his own 'person'. This nobody has any right to it but himself. The 'labour' of his body and the 'work' of his hands, we may say, are properly his. | |
From: John Locke (Second Treatise of Government [1690], 027) | |
A reaction: He doesn't have any grounds for this claim. Why doesn't a cow own its body? He slides from my ownership of my laborious efforts to my ownership of what I have been working on. I can't acquire your car by servicing it. |
19884 | There is only a civil society if the members give up all of their natural executive rights [Locke] |
Full Idea: Wherever any number of men so unite into one society as to quite every one his executive power of the law of Nature, and to resign it to the public, there and there only is a civil society. | |
From: John Locke (Second Treatise of Government [1690], 089) | |
A reaction: This seems to mean that you must give up your active ('executive') natural rights, but not your passive ones (which are inviolable). |
19877 | Fountain water is everyone's, but a drawn pitcher of water has an owner [Locke] |
Full Idea: Though the water running in the fountain be every one's, yet who can doubt but that in the pitcher is his only who drew it out? | |
From: John Locke (Second Treatise of Government [1690], 029) | |
A reaction: This would certainly be the normal consensus of a community, as long as there is plenty of water. The strong and fit gatherers get all the best firewood, so I suppose that is just tough on the others. |
6580 | Locke (and Marx) held that ownership of objects is a natural relation, based on the labour put into it [Locke, by Fogelin] |
Full Idea: Locke thought that property ownership reflected a natural relationship; for him the primordial notion of the ownership of an object is a function of the labour that one puts into it; Marx held a similar view. | |
From: report of John Locke (Second Treatise of Government [1690]) by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.3 | |
A reaction: Marx would have to think that, in order to believe that capitalist ownership of the means of production used by the workers was a fundamental injustice. A deeper Marxism might see the whole idea of 'ownership' as a capitalist (or feudal) conspiracy. |
20520 | Locke says 'mixing of labour' entitles you to land, as well as nuts and berries [Wolff,J on Locke] |
Full Idea: The great advantage of Locke's 'labour-mixing' argument is that it seems it can justify the appropriation of land, as well as nuts and berries. | |
From: comment on John Locke (Second Treatise of Government [1690]) by Jonathan Wolff - An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) 5 'Locke' | |
A reaction: The argument is dubious at best, and plausibly downright wicked. How much labour achieves ownership? What of previous people who worked the land but never thought to claim 'ownership'? Suppose I do more labour than you on 'your' land? |
19875 | A man's labour gives ownership rights - as long as there are fair shares for all [Locke] |
Full Idea: The 'labour' being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good left in common for others. | |
From: John Locke (Second Treatise of Government [1690], 027) | |
A reaction: The qualification at the end is a crucial (and problematic) addition to his theory. What is the situation when an area of wilderness is 98% owned? What of the single source of water? Who gets the best parts? Getting there first seems crucial. |
19874 | If a man mixes his labour with something in Nature, he thereby comes to own it [Locke] |
Full Idea: Whatever a man removes out of the state that Nature hath provided and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with it, and joined something to it that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. ...This excludes the common right of other men. | |
From: John Locke (Second Treatise of Government [1690], 027) | |
A reaction: This is Locke's famous Labour Theory of Value. Does picking it up count as labour? Putting a fence round it? Paying someone else to do the labour? Do bees own their honey? Settlers in the wilderness own nothing on day one? |
19876 | Gathering natural fruits gives ownership; the consent of other people is irrelevant [Locke] |
Full Idea: If the first gathering of acorns and apples made them not a man's, nothing else could. ...Will anyone say he had no right to them because he had not the consent of all mankind to make them his? | |
From: John Locke (Second Treatise of Government [1690], 028) | |
A reaction: The ideas of Nozick are all in this sentence. Does this idea justify the enclosure of common land? The first member of the community who thought of Locke's labour theory had a huge head's start. Liberal individualism rampant. |
19878 | Mixing labour with a thing bestows ownership - as long as the thing is not wasted [Locke] |
Full Idea: How far has God given us all things 'to enjoy'? As much as any one can make use of to any advantage of his life before it spoils, so much he may by his labour fix a property in. | |
From: John Locke (Second Treatise of Government [1690], 031) | |
A reaction: This adds a very different value to Locke's theory, because the person seems to be answerable to fellow citizens if they harvest important resources and then waste them. Where do luxuries fit in? |
19879 | A man owns land if he cultivates it, to the limits of what he needs [Locke] |
Full Idea: As much land as a man tills, plants, improves, cultivates, and can use the product of, so much is his property. | |
From: John Locke (Second Treatise of Government [1690], 032) | |
A reaction: Industrial farming rather changes this picture. Does the man himself decide how much he can use the product of, or do the neighbours tell him where his boundaries must be? 'Reason not the need', as King Lear said. What if he stops cultivating it? |
19898 | Soldiers can be commanded to die, but not to hand over their money [Locke] |
Full Idea: The sergeant that can command a soldier to march up to the mouth of a cannon ...cannot command that soldier to give him one penny of his money. | |
From: John Locke (Second Treatise of Government [1690], 139) | |
A reaction: A very nice and accurate illustration of a principle which runs so deep that it does indeed look like a basis of society. |
19881 | The aim of law is not restraint, but to make freedom possible [Locke] |
Full Idea: The end of law is not to abolish or restrain, but to preserve and enlarge freedom, for where there is no law there is no freedom. | |
From: John Locke (Second Treatise of Government [1690], 057) | |
A reaction: This fits both the liberal and the communitarian view of the matter. Talk of 'freedom' is commonplace in England by this date, where it is hardly mention 60 years earler. John Lilburne almost single-handedly brought this about. |
20856 | Justice, the law, and right reason are natural and not conventional [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus says (in On the Honourable) that justice is natural and not conventional, as are the law and right reason. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.128 | |
A reaction: How does he explain variations in the law between different states? Presumably some of them have got it wrong. What is the criterion for deciding which laws are natural? |
19868 | It is only by a law of Nature that we can justify punishing foreigners [Locke] |
Full Idea: If by the law of Nature every man hath not a power to punish offences against [the state], as he soberly judges the case to require, I see not how the magistrates of any community can punish an alien of another country. | |
From: John Locke (Second Treatise of Government [1690], 009) | |
A reaction: This is a nice point. You can't expect to be above the law in a foreign country, but you have entered into no social contract, unless visiting a place is a sort of contract. Intrusions into air space are often accidental visits. |
19869 | Punishment should make crime a bad bargain, leading to repentance and deterrence [Locke] |
Full Idea: Each transgression may be punished to that degree, and with so much severity, as will suffice to make it an ill bargain to the offender, give him cause to repent, and terrify others from doing the like. | |
From: John Locke (Second Treatise of Government [1690], 012) | |
A reaction: I gather that the consensus among experts is that the biggest deterrence is a high likelihood of being caught, rather than the severity of the punishment. |
19867 | Reparation and restraint are the only justifications for punishment [Locke] |
Full Idea: Reparation and restraint are the only two reasons why one man may lawfully do harm to another, which is that we call punishment. | |
From: John Locke (Second Treatise of Government [1690], 008) | |
A reaction: But by 'reparation' does be mean retribution, or compensation? He doesn't rule out capital punishment, but that may qualify as maximum restraint. |
19912 | Self-defence is natural, but not the punishment of superiors by inferiors [Locke] |
Full Idea: It is natural for us to defend life and limb, but that an inferior should punish a superior is against nature. | |
From: John Locke (Second Treatise of Government [1690], 236) | |
A reaction: He is obliquely referring to the execution of Charles I, even though he may have been legitimately overthrown. I wonder what exactly he means by 'superior' and 'inferior'. An idea from another age! |
19899 | The consent of the people is essential for any tax [Locke] |
Full Idea: The legislative power must not raise taxes on the property of the people without the consent of the people given by themselves or their deputies. | |
From: John Locke (Second Treatise of Government [1690], 142) | |
A reaction: He will be thinking of the resistance to Ship Money in the 1630s, which was a step towards civil war. The people of Boston, Ma, may have read this sentence 80 years later! |
1779 | We don't have obligations to animals as they aren't like us [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: We have no obligations of justice to other animals, because they are dissimilar to us. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.Ze.66 | |
A reaction: "Dissimilar" begs questions. Some human beings don't seem much like me. How are we going to treat visiting aliens? |
20857 | Justice is irrelevant to animals, because they are too unlike us [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: There is no justice between us and other animals because of the dissimilarity between us and them. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.129 | |
A reaction: [from lost On Justice Bk 1] What would he make of modern revelations about bonobos and chimpanzees? If there is great dissimilarity between some peoples, does that invalidate justice between them? He also said animals exist for our use. |