Combining Texts

Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'The Need for Roots' and 'fragments/reports'

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8 ideas

25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
By making money the sole human measure, inequality has become universal [Weil]
     Full Idea: By making money the sole, or almost the sole, motive of all actions, the sole, or almost the sole, measure of all things, the poison of inequality has been introduced everywhere.
     From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], I 'Equality')
     A reaction: Presumably this dates right back to the invention of money, and then increases with the endless rise of capitalism.
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
People have duties, and only have rights because of the obligations of others to them [Weil]
     Full Idea: A right is effectual only in relation to its corresponding obligation, springing not from the individual who possesses it, but from others who consider themselves under an obligation to him. In isolation a man only has duties, and only others have rights.
     From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], I 'Needs')
     A reaction: This seems correct, and obviously refutes the idea that people have intrinsic natural rights. However, it may be our sense of what nature requires which gives rise to the obligations we feel towards others.
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
Justice, the law, and right reason are natural and not conventional [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Chrysippus says (in On the Honourable) that justice is natural and not conventional, as are the law and right reason.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.128
     A reaction: How does he explain variations in the law between different states? Presumably some of them have got it wrong. What is the criterion for deciding which laws are natural?
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
To punish people we must ourselves be innocent - but that undermines the desire to punish [Weil]
     Full Idea: In order to have the right to punish the guilty, we ought first of all to purify ourselves of their crimes. …But once this is accomplished we shall no longer feel the least desire to punish, or as little as possible and with extreme sorrow.
     From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], III 'Growing')
     A reaction: Elsewhere she endorses punishment, as a social necessity, and a redemption for the wicked. This idea looks like a bit of a change of heart. She may be thinking of Jesus on the mote in someone's eye.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / d. Non-combatants
The soldier-civilian distinction should be abolished; every citizen is committed to a war [Weil]
     Full Idea: The distinction between soldiers and civilians, which the pressure of circumstances has already almost obliterated, should be entirely abolished. Every individual in the population owes his country the whole of his strength, resources and life itself.
     From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], II 'Nation')
     A reaction: Written in London in 1943. The year carpet bombing seriously escalated. The facts of warfare can change the ethics.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / a. Aims of education
Education is essentially motivation [Weil]
     Full Idea: Education - whether its object be children or adults, individuals or an entire people, or even oneself - consists in creating motives.
     From: Simone Weil (The Need for Roots [1943], III 'Growing')
     A reaction: I can't disagree. Intellectual motivation is simply what we find interesting, and there is no formula for that. A teacher can teach a good session, and only 5% of the pupils find it interesting. A bad session could be life-changing for one student.
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
We don't have obligations to animals as they aren't like us [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: We have no obligations of justice to other animals, because they are dissimilar to us.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.Ze.66
     A reaction: "Dissimilar" begs questions. Some human beings don't seem much like me. How are we going to treat visiting aliens?
Justice is irrelevant to animals, because they are too unlike us [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: There is no justice between us and other animals because of the dissimilarity between us and them.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.129
     A reaction: [from lost On Justice Bk 1] What would he make of modern revelations about bonobos and chimpanzees? If there is great dissimilarity between some peoples, does that invalidate justice between them? He also said animals exist for our use.