display all the ideas for this combination of texts
11 ideas
6767 | Rubies and sapphires are both corundum, with traces of metals varying their colours [Bird] |
Full Idea: Both rubies (valuable) and sapphires (less valuable) are corundum (Al2O3), differing only in their colours, for which traces of iron, titanium and chomium are responsible. | |
From: Alexander Bird (Philosophy of Science [1998], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: A nice example which illustrates how natural kinds determined by nominal essence could be drastically different from those suggested by real essence. It certainly suggests that corundum might be a natural kind, but ruby isn't. |
6768 | Tin is not one natural kind, but appears to be 21, depending on isotope [Bird] |
Full Idea: If real essences are decided by microstructure, then what we call the element tin is not a natural kind, but a mixture of 21 different kinds, one for each isotope. There also exist two different allotropes of tin - white tin and grey tin. | |
From: Alexander Bird (Philosophy of Science [1998], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: This example vividly brings out the difficulties of the Kripke-Putnam view. If natural kinds 'overlap', then there would be a very extensive overlap among the 21 isotopes of tin. |
6770 | Membership of a purely random collection cannot be used as an explanation [Bird] |
Full Idea: One might randomly collect diverse things and give the collection a name, but one would not expect it to explain anything to say that a certain object belonged to this collection. | |
From: Alexander Bird (Philosophy of Science [1998], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: This is in support of Bird's view that natural kinds are formulated because of their explanatory role. There is, though, an undeniable subjective aspect to explanation, in that explanations arise from the ignorance and interests of persons. |
6771 | Natural kinds may overlap, or be sub-kinds of one another [Bird] |
Full Idea: It seems clear that in some cases one natural kind may be a subkind of another, while in other cases natural kinds may overlap without one being the subkind of another. | |
From: Alexander Bird (Philosophy of Science [1998], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: Given the enormous difficulty of pinpointing natural kinds (e.g. Idea 6768), it is hard to know whether the comment is correct or not. Ellis says natural kinds come 'in hierarchies', which would make subkinds normal, but overlapping unlikely. |
6776 | Natural kinds are those that we use in induction [Bird] |
Full Idea: Natural kinds are the kinds one should make use of in inductive inference (if that is explanation which leads to laws). | |
From: Alexander Bird (Philosophy of Science [1998], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: The problem with this is that it is epistemological rather than ontological. In induction we use superficial resemblences that are immediately obvious, whereas the nature of kinds can be buried deep in the chemistry or physics. |
6773 | If F is a universal appearing in a natural law, then Fs form a natural kind [Bird] |
Full Idea: The proposal is that if F is a universal appearing in some natural law, then Fs form a natural kind. | |
From: Alexander Bird (Philosophy of Science [1998], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: Such proposals always invite the question 'What is it about F that enables it to be a universal in a natural law?' Nothing can be ultimately defined simply by its role. The character (essence, even) of the thing makes the role possible. |
6769 | In the Kripke-Putnam view only nuclear physicists can know natural kinds [Bird] |
Full Idea: In the Kripke-Putnam view, it is very difficult for anyone except nuclear physicists to pick out natural kinds, since everything else is made out of compounds of different isotopes. | |
From: Alexander Bird (Philosophy of Science [1998], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: The concept of a rigid 'natural kind' does not have to be sacred. Tin might be considered a natural kind, despite having 21 isotopes. What matters is protons, not the neutrons. |
6774 | Darwinism suggests that we should have a native ability to detect natural kinds [Bird] |
Full Idea: Creatures that are able to recognise natural kinds and laws have a selective advantage, so Darwinism suggests that we should have some native ability to detect natural kinds. | |
From: Alexander Bird (Philosophy of Science [1998], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: This seems right, but it makes 'natural kind' a rather instrumental concept, relative to our interests. True natural kinds cut across our interests, as when we discover by anatomy that whales are not fish, or that rubies and sapphires are both corundum. |
6764 | Nominal essence of a natural kind is the features that make it fit its name [Bird] |
Full Idea: The nominal essence of a natural kind K consists of those features a thing must have to deserve the name 'a K' by virtue of the meaning of that name. | |
From: Alexander Bird (Philosophy of Science [1998], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: Some people think 'nominal essence' is the only essence there is, which would make it relative to human languages. The rival view is that there are 'real essences'. I favour the latter view. |
6766 | Jadeite and nephrite are superficially identical, but have different composition [Bird] |
Full Idea: There might be more than one natural kind that shares the same superficial features, …jade, for example, has two forms, jadeite and nephrite, which are similar in superficial properties, but have different chemical composition and structure. | |
From: Alexander Bird (Philosophy of Science [1998], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: It might be questioned whether jadeite and nephrite really are natural kinds, either together or separately. |
6808 | Reference to scientific terms is by explanatory role, not by descriptions [Bird] |
Full Idea: I propose that reference to scientific terms, such as natural kinds and theoretical terms, is not determined by a sense or description attached to the term, but by its explanatory role. | |
From: Alexander Bird (Philosophy of Science [1998], Ch.8) | |
A reaction: He gives the example of an electron, which had the same role in electrical theory, despite changes in understanding its nature. One might talk of its 'natural' (causal) role, rather than its 'explanatory' role (which implies a human viewpoint). |