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8608 | Counterfactuals 'backtrack' if a different present implies a different past [Lewis] |
Full Idea: A counterfactual can be said to 'backtrack' if it can be said that if the present were different a different past would have led up to it (rather than if the present were different, the same past would have had a different outcome). | |
From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Dup,Sup,Div') | |
A reaction: A nice clear definition of a concept which is important in Lewis's analysis of causation. In the current context he is concerned with elucidation of determinism and materialism. I would say (intuitively) that all counterfactuals backtrack. |
8584 | Causal counterfactuals must avoid backtracking, to avoid epiphenomena and preemption [Lewis] |
Full Idea: My counterfactual analysis of causation needs counterfactuals that avoid backtracking; else the analysis faces fatal counterexamples involving epiphenomenal side-effects or cases of causal preemption. | |
From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Laws and C') | |
A reaction: The concept of true epiphenomena (absolutely no causal powers) strikes me as bogus. |