Combining Texts

Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Introduction - Ontology' and 'Properties'

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4 ideas

26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
People are trying to explain biological teleology in naturalistic causal terms [Lycan]
     Full Idea: There is now a small but vigorous industry whose purpose is to explicate biological teleology in naturalistic terms, typically in terms of causes.
     From: William Lycan (Introduction - Ontology [1999], p.10)
     A reaction: This looks like a good strategy. In some sense, it seems clear that the moon has no purpose, but an eyeball has one. Via evolution, one would expect to reduce this to causation. Purposes are real (not subjective), but they are reducible.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless.
     From: report of Archelaus (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.3
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
Regularities theories are poor on causal connections, counterfactuals and probability [Armstrong]
     Full Idea: Regularity theories make laws molecular, with no inner causal connections; also, only some cosmic regularities are manifestations of laws; molecular states can't sustain counterfactuals; and probabilistic laws are hard to accommodate.
     From: David M. Armstrong (Properties [1992], §2)
     A reaction: [very compressed] A helpful catalogue of difficulties. The first difficulty is the biggest one - that regularity theories have nothing to say about why there is a regularity. They offer descriptions instead of explanations.
The introduction of sparse properties avoids the regularity theory's problem with 'grue' [Armstrong]
     Full Idea: Regularity theories of laws face the grue problem. That, I think, can only be got over by introducing properties, sparse properties, into one's ontology.
     From: David M. Armstrong (Properties [1992], §2)
     A reaction: The problem is, roughly, that regularities have to be described in language, which is too arbitrary in character. Armstrong rightly tries to break the rigid link to language. See his Idea 8536, which puts reality before language.