Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Metaphysics', 'Introduction to 'Causation'' and 'reports'

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9 ideas

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation

8324	The problem is to explain how causal laws and relations connect, and how they link to the world [Sosa/Tooley]
	Full Idea: Causal states of affairs encompass causal laws, and causal relations between events or states of affairs; two key questions concern the relation between causal laws and causal relations, and the relation between these and non-causal affairs.
	From: E Sosa / M Tooley (Introduction to 'Causation' [1993], §1)
	A reaction: This is the agenda for modern analytical philosophy. I'm not quite clear what would count as an answer. When have you 'explained' a relation? Does calling it 'gravity', or finding an equation, explain that relation? Do gravitinos explain it?

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation

8328	Causation isn't energy transfer, because an electron is caused by previous temporal parts [Sosa/Tooley]
	Full Idea: The temporal parts of an electron (for example) are causally related, but this relation does not involve any transfer of energy or momentum. Causation cannot be identified with physical energy relations, and physicalist reductions look unpromising.
	From: E Sosa / M Tooley (Introduction to 'Causation' [1993], §1)
	A reaction: This idea, plus Idea 8327, are their grounds for rejecting Fair's proposal (Idea 8326). It feels like a different use of 'cause' when we say 'the existence of x was caused by its existence yesterday'. It is more like inertia. Destruction needs energy.

8327	If direction of causation is just direction of energy transfer, that seems to involve causation [Sosa/Tooley]
	Full Idea: The objection to Fair's view that the direction of causation is the direction of the transference of energy and/or momentum is that the concept of transference itself involves the idea of causation.
	From: E Sosa / M Tooley (Introduction to 'Causation' [1993], §1)
	A reaction: Does it? If a particle proceeds from a to b, how is that causation? ...But the problem is that the particle kicks open the door when it arrives (i.e. makes changes). We wouldn't call it causation if the transference didn't change any properties.

561	Is there cause outside matter, and can it be separated, and is it one or many? [Aristotle]
	Full Idea: We must especially inquire and investigate whether there is any cause beyond matter in itself or not, and whether this is separable or not, and whether it is one or many in number.
	From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0995b28)

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation

588	We exercise to be fit, but need fitness to exercise [Aristotle]
	Full Idea: Exercise is the cause of fitness, but fitness is also the cause of exercise.
	From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1013b10)

8330	Are causes sufficient for the event, or necessary, or both? [Sosa/Tooley]
	Full Idea: An early view of causation (Mill and Hume) is whatever is (ceteris paribus) sufficient for the event. A second view (E.Nagel) is that the cause should just be necessary. Some (R.Taylor) even contemplate the cause having to be necessary and sufficient.
	From: E Sosa / M Tooley (Introduction to 'Causation' [1993], §2)
	A reaction: A cause can't be necessary if there is some other way to achieve the effect. A single cause is not sufficient if many other factors are also essential. If neither of those is right, then 'both' is wrong. Enter John Mackie...

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation

8325	The dominant view is that causal laws are prior; a minority say causes can be explained singly [Sosa/Tooley]
	Full Idea: The dominant view is that causal laws are more basic than causal relations, with relations being logically supervenient on causal laws, and on properties and event relations; some, though, defend the singularist view, in which events alone can be related.
	From: E Sosa / M Tooley (Introduction to 'Causation' [1993], §1)
	A reaction: I am deeply suspicious about laws (see Idea 5470). I suspect that the laws are merely descriptions of the regularities that arise from the single instances of causation. We won't explain the single instances, but then laws don't 'explain' them either.

634	Pure Forms and numbers can't cause anything, and especially not movement [Aristotle]
	Full Idea: If we allow Forms or numbers, they will not be the cause of anything, or, if that is too strong, they will at any rate not be the cause of any movement.
	From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1075b23)
	A reaction: This is Benacerraf's famous observation (1973) that we can't accept a platonic account of numbers because, lacking causal powers, they are unknowable.

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity

14543	When a power and its object meet in the right conditions, an action necessarily follows [Aristotle]
	Full Idea: Whenever the potential active and the potentially affected items are associated in conditions propitious to the potentiality, the former must of necessity act and the latter must of necessity be affected.
	From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1048a08)
	A reaction: Of course the world could end between the two happenings, so this can't be full-scale metaphysical necessity. That point is not enough, though, to get rid of Aristotle's intuition here.