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3 ideas
10952 | Unusual kinds like mule are just a combination of two kinds [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The kind that is common to both horse and ass and which most nearly comprises them happens not to have a name, but can safely be presumed to be both, i.e. the horse-ass or 'mule'. ...A mule does not come from a mule. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1033b32) | |
A reaction: [second part at 1034b04] Does ancient Greek have a word for 'mule' - it sounds as if it doesn't. Nice chicken-and-egg problem. Must a natural kind be derived from a natural kind? No. Gold does not derive from gold. |
15170 | We distinguish species by their nominal essence, not by their real essence [Locke] |
Full Idea: Our ranking, and distinguishing natural substances into species consists in the nominal essences the mind makes, and not in the real essences to be found in things themselves. | |
From: John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 3.06.11) | |
A reaction: Note that, as far as I can see, Locke never denies the existence of real essences, or even that we might occasionally know them. He is here merely describing, fairly accurately, I think, his empiricist view of how these categories have come about. |
15993 | If we observe total regularity, there must be some unknown law and relationships controlling it [Locke] |
Full Idea: The things that, as far as observation reaches, we constantly find to proceed regularly, do act by a law set them; but yet by a law that we know not; ..their connections and dependencies being not discoverable in our ideas, we need experimental knowledge. | |
From: John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 4.03.29) | |
A reaction: In Idea 15992 he expressed scepticism about the amount of regularity that is actually found, with many so-called 'kinds' being quite irregular in their members. I agree. The only true natural kinds are the totally regular ones. Why a 'law'? |