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Ideas for 'works', 'Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd)' and 'Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy'

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3 ideas

26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
There are potential infinities (never running out), but actual infinity is incoherent [Aristotle, by Friend]
     Full Idea: Aristotle developed his own distinction between potential infinity (never running out) and actual infinity (there being a collection of an actual infinite number of things, such as places, times, objects). He decided that actual infinity was incoherent.
     From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Michèle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 1.3
     A reaction: Friend argues, plausibly, that this won't do, since potential infinity doesn't make much sense if there is not an actual infinity of things to supply the demand. It seems to just illustrate how boggling and uncongenial infinity was to Aristotle.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / a. Greek matter
Aristotle's matter can become any other kind of matter [Aristotle, by Wiggins]
     Full Idea: Aristotle's conception of matter permits any kind of matter to become any other kind of matter.
     From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by David Wiggins - Substance 4.11.2
     A reaction: This is obviously crucial background information when we read Aristotle on matter. Our 92+ elements, and fixed fundamental particles, gives a quite different picture. Aristotle would discuss form and matter quite differently now.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
Counterfactual causation makes causes necessary but not sufficient [Lipton]
     Full Idea: The counterfactual conception of causation makes causes necessary but not sufficient conditions for their effects.
     From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 08 'From cause')
     A reaction: Interesting. Then causes would be necessary, but would not necessitate. So what makes a cause sufficient?