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Ideas for 'works', 'Phaedo' and 'Causal Powers'

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6 ideas

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 5. Laws from Universals
15237 Originally Humeans based lawlike statements on pure qualities, without particulars [Harré/Madden]
     Full Idea: The original Humean suggestion was that lawlike statements must contain only purely qualitative predicates - that is, predicates which do not require in a statement of their meaning a reference to any particular object or spatio-temporal location.
     From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 2.II)
     A reaction: Harré and Madden are keen to promote particulars (with powers) as the foundation of scientific theory, and I agree with them. It strikes me as quite elementary that generalisations arise from particulars, so can't fundamentally explain them.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 7. Strictness of Laws
15238 Being lawlike seems to resist formal analysis, because there are always counter-examples [Harré/Madden]
     Full Idea: The whole idea of a formal analysis of the concept of lawlikeness has come to seem hopeless; every syntactical criterion proposed has a counter-example.
     From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 2.II)
     A reaction: They seem unaware of Lewis's work in this area, which may be the most sophisticated attempt at a (Humean) attempt at formal analysis. Personally I see nothing in Lewis that would make them change their minds.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
15223 Necessary effects will follow from some general theory specifying powers and structure of a world [Harré/Madden]
     Full Idea: Given some general theory specifying the fundamental causal powers and thereby laying down the general lineaments of a world, the necessity of certain effects can be inferred. They will be 'hypothetically necessary' (given those powers).
     From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 1.III.B)
     A reaction: This is a pretty good statement of the core idea of necessity at the heart of scientific essentialism. Are we to call this 'natural' necessity or 'metaphysical' necessity? Presumably it is 'relative' necessity. Big implications for induction!
15241 Humeans say there is no necessity in causation, because denying an effect is never self-contradictory [Harré/Madden]
     Full Idea: Humeans say there can be no element of necessity in the causal relation because the conjunction of a description of a cause with the negation of a description of its usual effect is never self-contradictory.
     From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 3.I)
     A reaction: We might say there actually is a contradiction, because you assert the existence of something, and then deny that existence by denying that the effect could occur. If the object is inert this is wrong, but if it is defined by its powers it is right.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
15240 In lawful universal statements (unlike accidental ones) we see why the regularity holds [Harré/Madden]
     Full Idea: The only sure way of distinguishing lawful and accidental universal statements is to point out that in the former cases we see why the regularity must hold, while in the latter case we do not.
     From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 2.II)
     A reaction: I agree with this, and also take it to be the solution to the problem of induction. That smoking causes cancer will be a true generalisation but not a law, until we see clearly why it happens.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
15239 We could call any generalisation a law, if it had reasonable support and no counter-evidence [Harré/Madden]
     Full Idea: There is a case for calling a generalisation a law when its only confirmation is the multiplication of instances, if they don't conflict with other criteria. In fact any supported generalisation could count as a law if there is no counter-evidence.
     From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 2.II)
     A reaction: This is the beginning of the modern doubts about laws of nature, fully articulated in Mumford 2004. It seems to me inescapable that laws drop out if our ontology is based on powerful particulars. They are just patterns of outcome.