display all the ideas for this combination of texts
2 ideas
7853 | Causation is based on either events, or facts, or states of affairs [Papineau] |
Full Idea: Any serious theory of the mind-brain must explain whether it thinks of causation in terms of events, facts, or states of affairs. | |
From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], Intro §6) | |
A reaction: I instantly prefer events, simply because they can be specified a little more precisely than the other two. Since cause has a direction in time, it would be nice to specify the times of its components, and events have times. |
7857 | Causes are instantiations of properties by particulars, or they are themselves basic particulars [Papineau] |
Full Idea: One view of causes is that they are facts, or instantiations of properties (maybe by particulars, making them 'Kim-events'); the alternative view is that causes themselves are basic particulars ('Davidson-events'). | |
From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 1.3) | |
A reaction: Like Papineau, I incline to the Kim view. It is too easy for philosophers to treat key ideas as unanalysable axioms of thought. An event typically has components and features. It is a contingent matter whether there are any events. |