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3 ideas
6939 | What is true of one piece of copper is true of another (unlike brass) [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The guiding principle is that what is true of one piece of copper is true of another; such a guiding principle with regard to copper would be much safer than with regard to many other substances - brass, for example. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p. 8) | |
A reaction: Peirce is so beautifully simple and sensible. This gives the essential notion of a natural kind, and is a key notion in our whole understanding of physical reality. |
15292 | We can base the idea of a natural kind on the mechanisms that produce natural necessity [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: Natural necessity involves the concept of generative mechanisms and powerful particulars, and these in turn can be the basis of a useful notion of a natural kind. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 7.V) | |
A reaction: Not sure about that. Say gold and silver are two kinds that lead to two outcomes. Each is a natural necessity. How do you distinguish them? Only by one being the gold-necessity and the other the silver-necessity. Circular? |
15299 | Species do not have enough constancy to be natural kinds [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: We know from biology that naturally occurring species do not exhibit the constancy required by the concept of natural kind. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 8.IV) | |
A reaction: This view has been challenged recently. How much constancy does a natural kind need? Even protons decay eventually, it seems. I think a natural kind just needs a fair degree of stability over a reasonable time-period. Tigers qualify. |