20812
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Covers are for shields, and sheaths for swords; likewise, all in the cosmos is for some other thing [Chrysippus]
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Full Idea:
Just as the cover was made for the sake of the shield, and the sheath for the sword, in the same way everything else except the cosmos was made for the sake of other things.
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From:
Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by M. Tullius Cicero - On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') 2.37
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A reaction:
Chrysippus was wise to stop at the cosmos. Similarly, religious teleology had better not ask about the purpose of God. What does he think pebbles are for? Nature is the source of stoic value, so it needs to be purposeful.
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5975
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Stoics say earth, air, fire and water are the primary elements [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
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Full Idea:
The Stoics call the four bodies - earth and water and air and fire - primary elements.
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From:
report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE], fr 444) by Plutarch - 72: Against Stoics on common Conceptions 1085c
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A reaction:
Elsewhere (fr 413) Chrysippus denies that they are all 'primary'. Essentially, though, he seems to be adopting the doctrine of Empedocles and Aristotle, in specific opposition to Epicurus' atomism.
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6731
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No one can explain how matter affects mind, so matter is redundant in philosophy [Berkeley]
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Full Idea:
How matter should operate on a spirit, or produce any idea in it, is what no philosopher will pretend to explain; it is therefore evident there can be no use of matter in natural philosophy.
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From:
George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], §50)
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A reaction:
An intriguing argument for idealism, which starts in Cartesian dualism, but then discards the physical world because of the notorious interaction problem. Of course, if he had thought that matter and spirit were one (Spinoza) the problem vanishes.
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6730
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We discover natural behaviour by observing settled laws of nature, not necessary connections [Berkeley]
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Full Idea:
That food nourishes, sleep refreshes, and fire warms us; all this we know, not by discovering any necessary connexion between our ideas, but only by the observation of the settled laws of nature.
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From:
George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], §31)
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A reaction:
Hume is famous for this idea, but it is found in Hobbes too (Idea 2364), and is the standard empiricist view of causation. The word 'settled' I take to imply that the laws are contingent, because they could become unsettled at any time.
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