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20812
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Covers are for shields, and sheaths for swords; likewise, all in the cosmos is for some other thing [Chrysippus]
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Full Idea:
Just as the cover was made for the sake of the shield, and the sheath for the sword, in the same way everything else except the cosmos was made for the sake of other things.
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From:
Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by M. Tullius Cicero - On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') 2.37
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A reaction:
Chrysippus was wise to stop at the cosmos. Similarly, religious teleology had better not ask about the purpose of God. What does he think pebbles are for? Nature is the source of stoic value, so it needs to be purposeful.
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5975
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Stoics say earth, air, fire and water are the primary elements [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
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Full Idea:
The Stoics call the four bodies - earth and water and air and fire - primary elements.
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From:
report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE], fr 444) by Plutarch - 72: Against Stoics on common Conceptions 1085c
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A reaction:
Elsewhere (fr 413) Chrysippus denies that they are all 'primary'. Essentially, though, he seems to be adopting the doctrine of Empedocles and Aristotle, in specific opposition to Epicurus' atomism.
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14301
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We have no good concept of solidity or matter, because accounts of them are all circular [Hume]
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Full Idea:
In order to form an idea of solidity, we must conceive two bodies pressing on each other without penetration. ..The ideas of secondary qualities are excluded, and the idea of motion depends on extension. This leaves us no just idea of solidity or matter.
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From:
David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739], I.IV.4), quoted by Stephen Mumford - Dispositions 02.3
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A reaction:
[compressed] For me these kind of strict empiricist arguments always recede when you accept the notion of an inference to be best explanation. We have some sort of notion of 'matter', but here the physicist seems to take over.
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8382
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For Hume a constant conjunction is both necessary and sufficient for causation [Hume, by Crane]
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Full Idea:
Hume held that constant conjunction between As and Bs is both necessary and sufficient for a causal relation. If As and Bs are conjoined that is sufficient for a causal relation; if A and B are causally related, necessarily they are constantly conjoined.
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From:
report of David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739]) by Tim Crane - Causation 1.2.2
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A reaction:
A helpful connection between Hume and the modern debate about conditions for causation (e.g. Mackie). It sounds as if, to spot the necessary condition, you need to independently see that A and B are causally related, which regularity does not allow.
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