20812
|
Covers are for shields, and sheaths for swords; likewise, all in the cosmos is for some other thing [Chrysippus]
|
|
Full Idea:
Just as the cover was made for the sake of the shield, and the sheath for the sword, in the same way everything else except the cosmos was made for the sake of other things.
|
|
From:
Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by M. Tullius Cicero - On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') 2.37
|
|
A reaction:
Chrysippus was wise to stop at the cosmos. Similarly, religious teleology had better not ask about the purpose of God. What does he think pebbles are for? Nature is the source of stoic value, so it needs to be purposeful.
|
5975
|
Stoics say earth, air, fire and water are the primary elements [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
|
|
Full Idea:
The Stoics call the four bodies - earth and water and air and fire - primary elements.
|
|
From:
report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE], fr 444) by Plutarch - 72: Against Stoics on common Conceptions 1085c
|
|
A reaction:
Elsewhere (fr 413) Chrysippus denies that they are all 'primary'. Essentially, though, he seems to be adopting the doctrine of Empedocles and Aristotle, in specific opposition to Epicurus' atomism.
|
10371
|
Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Davidson, by Schaffer,J]
|
|
Full Idea:
Davidson distinguishes between causation, an extensional relation that holds between coarse events, and explanation, which is an intensional relation that holds between the coarse events under a description.
|
|
From:
report of Donald Davidson (Causal Relations [1967]) by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 1.2
|
|
A reaction:
I'm unclear why everything has to be so coarse, when reality and causal events seem to fine-grained, but the distinction strikes me as good. Explanations relate to human understanding and human interests. Cf. Anscombe's view.
|
8346
|
Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson]
|
|
Full Idea:
The fuller we make the description of a cause, the better our chances of demonstrating that it was sufficient (as described) to produce the effect, and the worse our chances of demonstrating that it was necessary. (For the effect, it is the opposite).
|
|
From:
Donald Davidson (Causal Relations [1967], §3)
|
|
A reaction:
If the fullness of description is relevant, this suggests that Davidson is focusing on human explanations, rather than on the ontology of causation. If the cause IS necessary, why wouldn't a better description make that clearer?
|