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Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Letters to Burcher De Volder' and 'Political Liberalism'

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7 ideas

26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / a. Final purpose

20812	Covers are for shields, and sheaths for swords; likewise, all in the cosmos is for some other thing [Chrysippus]
	Full Idea: Just as the cover was made for the sake of the shield, and the sheath for the sword, in the same way everything else except the cosmos was made for the sake of other things.
	From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by M. Tullius Cicero - On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') 2.37
	A reaction: Chrysippus was wise to stop at the cosmos. Similarly, religious teleology had better not ask about the purpose of God. What does he think pebbles are for? Nature is the source of stoic value, so it needs to be purposeful.

26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements

21403	The later Stoics identified the logos with an air-fire compound, called 'pneuma' [Chrysippus, by Long]
	Full Idea: From Chrysippus onwards, the Stoics identified the logos throughout each world-cycle not with pure fire, but with a compound of fire and air, 'pneuma'.
	From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by A.A. Long - Hellenistic Philosophy 4.4.2
	A reaction: I suspect this was because breath is so vital to the human body.

20828	Fire is a separate element, not formed with others (as was previously believed) [Chrysippus, by Stobaeus]
	Full Idea: In his theory fire is said independently to be an element, since it is not formed together with another one, whereas according to the earlier theory fire is formed with other elements.
	From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.10.16c
	A reaction: The point is that fire precedes the other elements, and is superior to them.

5975	Stoics say earth, air, fire and water are the primary elements [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
	Full Idea: The Stoics call the four bodies - earth and water and air and fire - primary elements.
	From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE], fr 444) by Plutarch - 72: Against Stoics on common Conceptions 1085c
	A reaction: Elsewhere (fr 413) Chrysippus denies that they are all 'primary'. Essentially, though, he seems to be adopting the doctrine of Empedocles and Aristotle, in specific opposition to Epicurus' atomism.

26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / c. Matter as extension

13185	Even if extension is impenetrable, this still offers no explanation for motion and its laws [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: Even if we grant impenetrability is added to extension, nothing complete is brought about, nothing from which a reason for motion, and especially the laws of motion, can be given.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Burcher De Volder [1706], 1704 or 1705)
	A reaction: When it comes to the reasons for the so-called 'laws of nature', scientists give up, because they've only got mathematical descriptions, whereas the philosopher won't give up (even though, embarassingly, the evidence is running a bit thin).

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature

13177	An entelechy is a law of the series of its event within some entity [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: I recognize a primitive entelechy in the active force found in motion, something analogous to the soul, whose nature consists in a certain law of the same series of changes.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Burcher De Volder [1706], 1699.03.24)
	A reaction: This is his 'law-of-the-series', which is a speculative attempt to pin down the character of the active essence of things which gives rise to activity. The law of such activity is within the things themselves, as scientific essentialists claim.

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws

13093	The only permanence in things, constituting their substance, is a law of continuity [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: Nothing is permanent in things except the law itself, which involves a continuous succession ...The fact that a certain law persists ...is the very fact that constitutes the same substance.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Burcher De Volder [1706], 1704)
	A reaction: Aristotle and Leibniz are the very clear ancestors of modern scientific essentialism. I've left out a few inconvenient bits, about containing 'the whole universe', and containing all 'future states'. For Leibniz, laws are entirely rooted in things.