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Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Every Thing Must Go' and 'Frege's Distinction of Sense and Reference'

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8 ideas

26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / a. Final purpose

20812	Covers are for shields, and sheaths for swords; likewise, all in the cosmos is for some other thing [Chrysippus]
	Full Idea: Just as the cover was made for the sake of the shield, and the sheath for the sword, in the same way everything else except the cosmos was made for the sake of other things.
	From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by M. Tullius Cicero - On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') 2.37
	A reaction: Chrysippus was wise to stop at the cosmos. Similarly, religious teleology had better not ask about the purpose of God. What does he think pebbles are for? Nature is the source of stoic value, so it needs to be purposeful.

26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements

21403	The later Stoics identified the logos with an air-fire compound, called 'pneuma' [Chrysippus, by Long]
	Full Idea: From Chrysippus onwards, the Stoics identified the logos throughout each world-cycle not with pure fire, but with a compound of fire and air, 'pneuma'.
	From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by A.A. Long - Hellenistic Philosophy 4.4.2
	A reaction: I suspect this was because breath is so vital to the human body.

20828	Fire is a separate element, not formed with others (as was previously believed) [Chrysippus, by Stobaeus]
	Full Idea: In his theory fire is said independently to be an element, since it is not formed together with another one, whereas according to the earlier theory fire is formed with other elements.
	From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.10.16c
	A reaction: The point is that fire precedes the other elements, and is superior to them.

5975	Stoics say earth, air, fire and water are the primary elements [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
	Full Idea: The Stoics call the four bodies - earth and water and air and fire - primary elements.
	From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE], fr 444) by Plutarch - 72: Against Stoics on common Conceptions 1085c
	A reaction: Elsewhere (fr 413) Chrysippus denies that they are all 'primary'. Essentially, though, he seems to be adopting the doctrine of Empedocles and Aristotle, in specific opposition to Epicurus' atomism.

26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 3. Knowing Kinds

14956	Explanation by kinds and by clusters of properties just express the stability of reality [Ladyman/Ross]
	Full Idea: Philosophers sometimes invoke natural kinds as if they explain the possibility of explanation. This is characteristically neo-scholastic. That anything can be explained, and that properties cluster together, express one fact: reality is relatively stable.
	From: J Ladyman / D Ross (Every Thing Must Go [2007], 5.6)
	A reaction: Odd idea. I would have thought that if there are indeed kinds and clusters, this would explain a great deal more than mere stability. Or, more accurately, they would invite a more substantial explanation than mere stability would seem to need.

26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds

14957	There is nothing more to a natural kind than a real pattern in nature [Ladyman/Ross]
	Full Idea: Everything that a naturalist could legitimately want from the concept of a natural kind can be had simply by reference to real patterns.
	From: J Ladyman / D Ross (Every Thing Must Go [2007], 5.6)
	A reaction: I think I agree with this, and with the general idea that natural kinds are overrated. There are varying degrees of stability in nature, and where there is a lot of stability our inductive reasoning can get to work. And that's it.

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation

14954	Causation is found in the special sciences, but may have no role in fundamental physics [Ladyman/Ross]
	Full Idea: The idea of causation, as it is used in science, finds its exemplars in the special sciences, and it is presently open empirical question whether that notion will have any ultimate role to play in fundamental physics.
	From: J Ladyman / D Ross (Every Thing Must Go [2007], 4.5)
	A reaction: Note that they seem to always have a notion of 'ultimate' physics hovering over their account. I wonder. There is nothing in this idea to make me think that I should eliminate the idea of causation from my metaphysics.

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature

14902	Science may have uninstantiated laws, inferred from approaching some unrealised limit [Ladyman/Ross]
	Full Idea: It is possible that uninstantiated laws can be established in science, and consequently bear explanatory weight, ..if we need reasons for thinking that the closer conditions get to some limit, the more they approximate to some ideal.
	From: J Ladyman / D Ross (Every Thing Must Go [2007], 1.2.3)
	A reaction: [The cite Hüttemann 2004] I am dubious about laws, but I take this to be a point in favour of inference to the best explanation, and against accounts of laws as supervenient of how things actually are.