20812
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Covers are for shields, and sheaths for swords; likewise, all in the cosmos is for some other thing [Chrysippus]
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Full Idea:
Just as the cover was made for the sake of the shield, and the sheath for the sword, in the same way everything else except the cosmos was made for the sake of other things.
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From:
Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by M. Tullius Cicero - On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') 2.37
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A reaction:
Chrysippus was wise to stop at the cosmos. Similarly, religious teleology had better not ask about the purpose of God. What does he think pebbles are for? Nature is the source of stoic value, so it needs to be purposeful.
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5975
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Stoics say earth, air, fire and water are the primary elements [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
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Full Idea:
The Stoics call the four bodies - earth and water and air and fire - primary elements.
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From:
report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE], fr 444) by Plutarch - 72: Against Stoics on common Conceptions 1085c
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A reaction:
Elsewhere (fr 413) Chrysippus denies that they are all 'primary'. Essentially, though, he seems to be adopting the doctrine of Empedocles and Aristotle, in specific opposition to Epicurus' atomism.
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9215
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Causation is easier to disrupt than logic, so metaphysics is part of nature, not vice versa [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
It would be harder to break P-and-Q implying P than the connection between cause and effect. This difference in strictness means it is more plausible that natural necessities include metaphysical necessities, than vice versa.
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From:
Kit Fine (The Varieties of Necessity [2002], 6)
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A reaction:
I cannot see any a priori grounds for the claim that causation is more easily disrupted than logic. It seems to be based on the strategy of inferring possibilities from what can be imagined, which seems to me to lead to wild misunderstandings.
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