display all the ideas for this combination of texts
3 ideas
14175 | We can drop 'cause', and just make inferences between facts [Russell] |
Full Idea: On the whole it is not worthwhile preserving the word 'cause': it is enough to say, what is far less misleading, that any two configurations allow us to infer any other. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §460) | |
A reaction: Russell spelled this out fully in a 1912 paper. This sounds like David Hume, but he prefers to talk of 'habit' rather than 'inference', which might contain a sneaky necessity. |
14172 | Moments and points seem to imply other moments and points, but don't cause them [Russell] |
Full Idea: Some people would hold that two moments of time, or two points of space, imply each other's existence; yet the relation between these cannot be said to be causal. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §449) | |
A reaction: Famously, Russell utterly rejected causation a few years after this. The example seems clearer if you say that two points or moments can imply at least one point or instant between them, without causing them. |
16215 | Causation is nothing more than the counterfactuals it grounds? [Hawley] |
Full Idea: Counterfactual accounts of causation say that a causal connection is exhausted by the counterfactuals it appears to ground. | |
From: Katherine Hawley (How Things Persist [2001], 3.5) | |
A reaction: I am bewildered as to how this became a respectable view in philosophy. I quite understand that this might exhaust the 'logic' of causal relations. Presumably you can have counterfactuals in mathematics which are not causal? |