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Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Appearance and Reality' and 'Aristotle on Substance'

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3 ideas

26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / b. Prime matter
Prime matter has no place in Aristotle's theories, and passages claiming it are misread [Gill,ML]
     Full Idea: I argue that prime matter has no place in Aristotle's elemental theory. ..References to prime matter are found in Aristotle's work because his theory was thought to need the doctrine. If I am right, these passages will all admit of another interpretation.
     From: Mary Louise Gill (Aristotle on Substance [1989], App)
     A reaction: If correct, this strikes me as important for the history of ideas, because scholastics got themselves in a right tangle over prime matter. See Pasnau on it. It pushed the 17th century into corpuscularianism.
Prime matter is actually nothing and potentially everything (or potentially an element) [Gill,ML]
     Full Idea: Prime matter is supposed to be actually nothing and potentially everything or, at any rate, potentially the simplest bodies - earth, water, air and fire.
     From: Mary Louise Gill (Aristotle on Substance [1989], Ch.1)
     A reaction: The view that the four elements turn out to be prime matter is distinctive of Gill's approach. Prime matter sounds like quark soup in the early universe.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One
Reality is one, because plurality implies relations, and they assert a superior unity [Bradley]
     Full Idea: Reality is one. It must be simple because plurality, taken as real, contradicts itself. Plurality implies relations, and, through its relations it unwillingly asserts always a superior unity.
     From: F.H. Bradley (Appearance and Reality [1893], p.519), quoted by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.2
     A reaction: This argument depends on a belief in 'internal' relations, which Russell famously attacked. If an internal feature of every separate item was its relation to other things, then I suppose Bradley would be right. But it isn't, and he isn't.