display all the ideas for this combination of texts
5 ideas
| 16242 | Laws of nature are ontological bedrock, and beyond analysis [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: The laws of nature stand in no need of 'philosophical analysis'; they ought to be posited as ontological bedrock. | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], Intro) | |
| A reaction: This is Maudlin's most basic principle, and I don't agree with it. The notion that laws are more deeply embedded in reality than the physical stuff they control is a sort of 'law-mysticism' that needs to be challenged. |
| 16247 | Laws are primitive, so two indiscernible worlds could have the same laws [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: Laws are ontologically primitives at least in that two worlds could differ in their laws but not in any observable respect. ….[21] I take content of the laws to be expressed by equations. | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 1.4) | |
| A reaction: At least that spells out his view fairly dramatically, but I am baffled as to what he thinks a law could be. He is arguing against the Lewis regularity-axioms view, and the Armstrong universal-relations view. He ignores the essentialist view. |
| 16272 | Fundamental laws say how nature will, or might, evolve from some initial state [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: The fundamental laws of nature appear to be laws of temporal evolution: they specify how the state of the universe will, or might, evolve from a given intial state. | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 6) | |
| A reaction: Maudlin takes both laws of nature and the passage of time to be primitive facts, and this is how they are connected. I think (this week) that I take time and causation to be primitive, but not laws. |
| 16251 | 'Humans with prime house numbers are mortal' is not a law, because not a natural kind [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: 'All humans who live in houses with prime house numbers are mortal' is not a law because the class referred to is not a natural kind. | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 1.6) | |
| A reaction: Maudlin wants laws to be primitive, but he now needs a primitive notion of a natural kind to make it work. If kinds generate laws, you can ditch the laws, and build your theory on the kinds. He also says no death is explained by 'all humans are mortal'. |
| 16270 | If laws are just regularities, then there have to be laws [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: On the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis account of laws, I take it that if the world is extensive and variegated enough, then there must be laws. | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 5.2) | |
| A reaction: A nice point. If there is any sort of pattern discernible in the surface waves on the sea, then there must be a law to cover it, not matter how vague or complex. |