Combining Texts

Ideas for 'The Advancement of Learning', 'Varieties of Causation' and 'On the Heavens'

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9 ideas

26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / a. Final purpose

394	An unworn sandal is in vain, but nothing in nature is in vain [Aristotle]
	Full Idea: We say of a sandal which is not worn that it is in vain; God and nature, however, do nothing in vain.
	From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 271a33)

396	There has to be some goal, and not just movement to infinity [Aristotle]
	Full Idea: There has to be some goal, and not just movement to infinity.
	From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 277a26)

26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied

12125	Teleological accounts are fine in metaphysics, but they stop us from searching for the causes [Bacon]
	Full Idea: To say 'leaves are for protecting of fruit', or that 'clouds are for watering the earth', is well inquired and collected in metaphysic, but in physic they are impertinent. They are hindrances, and the search of the physical causes hath been neglected.
	From: Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VII.7)
	A reaction: This is the standard rebellion against Aristotle which gave rise to the birth of modern science. The story has been complicated by natural selection, which bestows a sort of purpose on living things. Nowadays we pursue both paths.

26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements

16102	Aether moves in circles and is imperishable; the four elements perish, and move in straight lines [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
	Full Idea: For Aristotle, aether and the four sublunary elements obey different physical laws. Aether moves naturally in a circle and, unlike its lower counterparts, is not a source of perishability. The four sublunary elements move naturally in straight lines.
	From: report of Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE]) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Ch.2
	A reaction: I think it is anachronistic for Gill to talk of 'obeying' and 'laws'. She should have said that they have different 'natures'. We can be amused by Greek errors, until we stare hard at the problems they were trying to solve.

17463	An element is what bodies are analysed into, and won't itself divide into something else [Aristotle]
	Full Idea: An element is a body into which other bodies may be analyzed, present in them potentially or in actuality (which of these is still disputable), and not itself divisible into bodies different in form. That is what all men mean by element.
	From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 302a05), quoted by Weisberg/Needham/Hendry - Philosophy of Chemistry 1.1
	A reaction: This is the classic definition of an element, which endured for a long time, and has been replaced by an 'actual components' view. Obviously analysis nowadays goes well beyond the atoms.

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation

8442	What law would explain causation in the case of causing a table to come into existence? [Sosa]
	Full Idea: If I fasten a board onto a tree stump, causing a table to come into existence, ...what law of nature or, even, what quasi-law or law-like principle could possibly play in such a case of generation the role required by nomological accounts?
	From: Ernest Sosa (Varieties of Causation [1980], 1)
	A reaction: A very nice question. The nomological account is at its strongest when rocks fall off walls or magnets attract, but all sorts of other caused events seem too messy or complex or original to fit the story.

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity

8445	The necessitated is not always a result or consequence of the necessitator [Sosa]
	Full Idea: The necessitated is not always a result or consequence of the necessitator. If p-and-q is a fact, then this necessitates that p, but the fact that p need not be a result or consequence of the fact that p-and-q.
	From: Ernest Sosa (Varieties of Causation [1980], p.242)
	A reaction: This is obviously correct, and needs to be borne in mind when considering necessary causation. It is not enough to produce a piece of logic; something in the link from cause to effect must be demonstrated to be necessary.

8444	Where is the necessary causation in the three people being tall making everybody tall? [Sosa]
	Full Idea: It is not clear how to analyse the form of necessary causation found in the only three people in the room being tall causing everybody in the room to be tall.
	From: Ernest Sosa (Varieties of Causation [1980], 5)
	A reaction: I would want to challenge this as a case of causation. There are no events or processes involved. It seems that a situation described in one way can also be described in another.

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism

12118	Essences are part of first philosophy, but as part of nature, not part of logic [Bacon]
	Full Idea: I assign to summary philosophy the operation of essences (as quantity, similitude, diversity, possibility), with this distinction - that they be handled as they have efficacy in nature, and not logically.
	From: Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning [1605], II.VII.3)
	A reaction: I take this to be a splendid motto for scientific essentialism, in a climate where modal logicians appear to have taken over the driving seat in our understanding of essences.