Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Are there propositions?', 'works' and 'Essays on Active Powers 3: Princs of action'

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7 ideas

26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
Leibniz rejected atoms, because they must be elastic, and hence have parts [Leibniz, by Garber]
     Full Idea: Leibniz held that there can be no atoms in nature, nothing perfectly solid and hard, since elasticity entails the existence of smaller parts that can move with respect to one another.
     From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 5
     A reaction: Thus, I suppose, we discover that atoms have mercurial electron shells. Are quarks or electrons elastic? The debate about true atoms is not over, and probably never will be. Leibniz's point is a good one.
Microscopes and the continuum suggest that matter is endlessly divisible [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Micrographers observe qualities of larger things found in smaller things. And if this proceeds to infinity - which is possible since the continuum is divisible to infinity - any atom will be an infinite species, and there will be worlds within worlds.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690], A VI ii 241)
     A reaction: [a work of the 1670s] The microscope had a huge impact on Leibniz, much more than the telescope.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / a. Early Modern matter
Leibniz struggled to reconcile bodies with a reality of purely soul-like entities [Jolley on Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Leibniz seems never to have made up his mind completely on how to accommodate bodies within a metaphysic which recognises only soul-like entities as fully real.
     From: comment on Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by Nicholas Jolley - Leibniz Intro
     A reaction: [The soul-like entities are his 'monads']. His choice must be to either say they are unreal, or that they are real and separate from the monads, or that they are a manifestation of the monads. His problem, not mine.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / c. Matter as extension
Leibniz eventually said resistance, rather than extension, was the essence of body [Leibniz, by Pasnau]
     Full Idea: Leibniz eventually rejected extension altogether as part of the essence of body, and replaced it with resistance.
     From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 15.5
     A reaction: This makes body consist of active force, rather than mere geometry. Much better.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
Leibniz wanted to explain motion and its laws by the nature of body [Leibniz, by Garber]
     Full Idea: Leibniz seeks the big picture: the nature of body as a grounding for an account of motion and its laws.
     From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 4
     A reaction: Garber is contrasting this with Newton's approaches, who just pleads ignorance of the bigger picture. Essentialists must beware of inventing a bigger picture simply because they desperately want a bigger picture.
The law within something fixes its persistence, and accords with general laws of nature [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Nothing is permanent in a substance except the law itself which determines the continuous succession of its states and accords within the individual substance with the laws of nature that govern the whole world.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690], G II:263), quoted by David Wiggins - Sameness and Substance 3 epig
     A reaction: An interesting link between the law-of-series within a substance, and the broader concept of laws outside it.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 10. Closure of Physics
Leibniz had an unusual commitment to the causal completeness of physics [Leibniz, by Papineau]
     Full Idea: Unlike most philosophers prior to the twentieth century, Leibniz was committed to the causal completeness of physics.
     From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness 1.4
     A reaction: It has been suggested that Leibniz was actually, in private, a determinist (see Idea 7841), which would fit. Leibniz is enigmatic, but he may have proposed the closure of physics to glorify God, only to find that God was beginning to look irrelevant.